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I take over the Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in 
Philosophy after a two-year apprenticeship with Bernie 
Canteñs, whose professionalism and leadership I can only 
hope to emulate. over the next few years, I aim to continue 
to uphold the standards of excellence set by Bernie, and 
all past editors, and ensure that the newsletter fulfills its 
mission as a forum for the discussion of issues related to 
philosophy and the Hispanic/Latina/o experience. As in the 
present embodiment of the newsletter, a goal will be to 
showcase the contributions of emerging and established 
Latina/o philosophers, and to continue to serve as a forum 
for the discussion of issues marginalized in mainstream 
philosophical journals and forums.
the fall 2013 issue of the newsletter begins with robert eli 
Sánchez, Jr.’s “the Process of defining Latino/a Philosophy,” 
a report from the first national symposium” on the current 
state of the Latino/a philosopher and Latino/a philosophy in 
the United States, a gathering held at SUNY Stony Brook in 
march 2013. Sánchez’s report is an indication that, as he puts 
it, Latin American and Latino/a philosophy is “here to stay.” 
Instantiating this point, Natalie Cisneros’s interview with 
philosopher José medina (Vanderbilt) sheds light on Professor 
medina’s philosophical development, his contributions, and 
the future of his research. It is an inspired and inspirational 
interview that reflects the heights to which emerging 
Latino/a philosophers might aspire. Continuing with this 
theme, the third piece, Reframing the Practice of Philosophy: 
Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge, is a review of George 
Yancy’s edited volume on the marginalization of Latino/a and 
African Americans in the academy. Grant Silva’s sensitive 
and informed reading of this important collection gets to 
the heart of the matter, concluding that “Yancy’s text allows 
for the emergence of patterns of systematic exclusion that 
venture beyond the incidental.” In one of two articles in this 
newsletter, Francisco Gallegos offers an excellent reading of 
the mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla’s Fenomenologia del 
Relajo. Gallegos defends Portilla’s assertion that relajo—or 
the suspension of seriousness—is a socially destructive act, 
and argues against the view that perhaps Portilla overlooked 
the revolutionary implications of such suspensions. Finally, 
Kim díaz’s article on José Carlos mariátegui explores the 
Peruvian philosopher’s indigenous communism. díaz spells 
out mariátegui’s notion of a “revolutionary myth,” arguing that 
only through the notion of a socialist myth could mariátegui 
reconcile the goals of european communism/marxism with 
the realities of the indigenous communities of Peru. thus, 
she situates mariátegui’s thought in both the historical and 
intellectual context of the 1920s.
SPeCIAL FeAtUreS
The Process of Defining Latino/a 
Philosophy
robert eli Sánchez, Jr.
the College of William and mary
The following is a report on “Latino/a Philosopher: A National 
Symposium,” which took place at Stony Brook University on 
March 15-16, 2013. My aim here is not to summarize the papers 
one by one, but to convey some of the general themes and 
concerns that emerged from our conversation, and which 
loosely connect the talks that were heard. What I cannot 
convey, however, is the enthusiasm and camaraderie—or 
what Ofelia Schutte aptly called “the energía Latina”—which 
made this such a special event. I take full responsibility for 
any confusion herein and encourage the reader to refer to 
the forthcoming anthology of essays that were presented. 
For the past seventy years, Latin American philosophy has 
struggled to establish a permanent place on the academic 
scene in the United States. For those of us who have had a 
reason or desire to teach it to ourselves and represent the 
importance of an unfamiliar philosophy, we could not be sure 
that it would ever be more than a side interest—something in 
addition to the “serious philosophy” that would one day earn 
us tenure. However, having attended “Latino/a Philosopher: 
A National Symposium,” I believe it is now safe to say that 
Latin American philosophy is here to stay. It’s not that there 
haven’t been a number of signs attesting to the growing 
respectability of Latin American philosophy in the United 
States: publications, dissertations, job advertisements, other 
conferences, and this newsletter, to name a few. But never 
have so many Latino/a philosophers gathered together in the 
United States to discuss their own philosophy, confirming 
that there is finally a critical mass of philosophers in the 
United States who identify as Latino/a and who believe that 
their ethnic identity somehow impacts the philosophy they 
produce. to say that Latin American philosophy is here to 
stay, then, is in part to say that Latinos/as are here to stay.
to be more precise, what we witnessed was, in some 
way, the arrival of Latino/a philosophy, for it is not just the 
growing interest in philosophers from, or issues particular to, 
Latin America that is becoming more popular, but the arrival 
of what Jorge J. e. Gracia called in the first paper of the 
symposium an “ethnic philosophy”—that is, a “philosophy 
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produced by an ethnos and, as such, [one that] reflects 
the ethnos and whatever may characterize it.”1 So it was 
the number and mutual recognition of the Latinos/as (as 
opposed to Latin Americans) in attendance that signaled 
the arrival of a distinct philosophy, one that is characterized 
by the lived experience of thinkers of Latin American 
descent who are situated in the United States today. And 
the emphasis of the symposium was placed on Latino/a 
philosophers (as opposed to Latino/a philosophy), since, 
as eduardo mendieta, the convener and organizer of the 
event, said in his opening remarks, “before there is Latino/a 
philosophy, there are Latino/a philosophers.”
As Gracia noted, however, the very phrase “Latino/a 
philosophy” is a Pandora’s Box of philosophical questions 
and debate,2 and it is not the number of Latinos/as alone 
that marks the existence of Latino/a philosophy. So one may 
expect that announcing the arrival of Latino/a philosophy 
implies that we are ready to define what it is and close 
Pandora’s Box. However, as Gracia argued, using the phrase 
“Latino/a philosophy” meaningfully does not require that 
one knows or can say what it is, only “that in certain periods 
and places, Latino/a philosophy has shared certain interests, 
topics, approaches, or methods that were geared toward the 
immediate historical context and thus distinguishable from 
other philosophies of ethnic groups in other places and 
times.” moreover, there’s a double sense of “define” that is 
relevant here: besides being able to say what something is, 
we can also speak of defining something in the sense of 
making or establishing what it is. So, given the emphasis on 
Latino/a philosophers as opposed to Latino/a philosophy, 
although the what-is-it question was addressed, the primary 
aim of the symposium was to share our interests, topics, 
and approaches, and to reflect together on our immediate 
historical context—that is, to take a weekend (hopefully the 
first of many) to define Latino/a philosophy in the second 
sense of the word.
the most central piece of context that inspired almost all 
of the papers is the fact that Latinos/as are currently the 
most underrepresented minority in philosophy. As manuel 
Vargas reminded us, “Latinos are almost entirely invisible 
in the profession. According to the statistics gathered by 
the American Philosophical Association, Latinos make up 2 
percent of philosophers in Ph.d.-granting institutions,” and 
only slightly more in other tenure-track positions.3 And this in 
spite of the fact that they are the largest and fastest growing 
minority in the United States—currently at 52 million or about 
17 percent of the population.4 Philosophy, in other words, 
is not only “demographically challenged,” as Linda Alcoff 
has put it,5 but the numbers suggest that it is especially 
unwelcoming to Latinos/as.
For ofelia Schutte, what the “dismally low representation” 
confirms is that, given the current practices, standards, 
and teachers of philosophy, Latinos/as tend not to be 
attracted to the field. they tend to see studying philosophy 
as a mark of social privilege—“at best, a protected space 
for asking unusually clever questions and, at worst, a field 
reserved for exclusionary white privilege”—and so they fail 
to identify with either the subject or its professors. the result 
is that Latinos/as tend to see philosophy as an ultimatum 
between proving oneself in a challenging discipline and 
staying true to one’s socio-cultural—some of the presenters 
would add economic—roots. In short, because of the 
underrepresentation of Latinos/as in philosophy, a certain 
population is being discouraged from exploring a resource 
that could help to address a number of issues that do 
concern Latinos/as. 
Schutte argues further that we are not facing an issue that 
is purely sociological or political, but one that reflects a 
crisis in philosophy itself. In her view, philosophy is a social 
construction: “a social practice made possible by educational, 
financial, and scientific institutions whose standards of 
performance do not work in isolation from the rest of our 
social practices.” So the fact that philosophy has always 
been dominated by a certain population is not unconnected 
from what we think philosophy is. She claims that the fact 
that the core identity of philosophy has been established by 
white Anglo males—i.e., the dominant group whose gender 
and racial and ethnic identity is an uncontested privilege—in 
part explains the incessant effort in philosophy to separate 
reasons from the reasoner, an approach which in effect has 
ruled out counting as philosophical those issues that are tied 
to one’s identity, and thus the larger metaphilosophical issue 
concerning the relation between philosophy and identity. As 
a result, Schutte thinks, philosophy is “socially and culturally 
impaired,” something that it is becoming uncomfortably 
aware of as the demographics start to shift.6
According to Linda Alcoff and others, the idea that “philosophy 
is just philosophy” is itself exclusionary, a stand-in for 
“philosophy is what we do” and the basis for “what you do is 
not philosophy.” And philosophy has been able to perpetuate 
this binary and remain “decontextualized,” as Alcoff says, by 
continuing to “marginalize those constituencies that complain 
about its demographic and philosophical narrowness, and 
those who might thematize its demographic limitations as a 
problem with philosophical implications.” the challenge facing 
Latinos/as is compounded, then, since it is not just that certain 
topics or approaches are considered non-philosophical, but 
that those in the core of the discipline are often justified 
in dismissing them as such. In other words, since certain 
competing views of philosophy are already discounted, almost 
nobody receives the financial and educational resources 
to develop them, which entails that these views will remain 
underdeveloped, which will in turn justify rejecting them as 
non-philosophical or “bad philosophy.”
Another problem with underrepresentation that has 
philosophical implications, according to manuel Vargas, is 
that the lack of diversity in philosophy, ethnic and otherwise, 
makes us prone to epistemic error and distortion, especially 
in subfields that are “intended to encompass populations 
that are rarely part of the philosophical profession”—
e.g., moral, social, and political philosophy. And while 
Vargas points to specific ways the “epistemic reliability” 
of philosophy is compromised by the lack of diversity in 
general, and the absence of Latinos/as in particular, perhaps 
the biggest compromise is that, given the lack of diversity, it 
is almost impossible to tell exactly how philosophy might be 
improved by epistemic diversity. He says, “until our discipline 
has had substantial engagement with the beliefs, intuitions, 
convictions, concerns, and standpoints of those in non-male, 
non-white social positions, it should, on the present account, 
be extraordinarily difficult for us to make out the precise 
ways in which we are subject to distortion.”
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So, according to everyone so far, a major problem with the lack 
of diversity in philosophy is that it breeds the lack of diversity, 
and makes it difficult to appreciate and defend the value of 
diversity in a homogenous field. Because there are so few 
Latinos/as in philosophy, and because Latino/a philosophers 
are discouraged from philosophizing as Latinos/as—from 
exploring one’s socio-cultural roots through philosophy—
neither philosophy nor Latinos/as have felt an urgent 
need for each other. And the collective recommendation 
seemed to be, as rocío Zambrana put it, that more diversity 
represents a “chance” for both philosophy and Latinos/as—a 
chance for philosophy to expand its horizons and improve its 
reliability, and for Latinos/as to find in philosophy a resource 
to address their concerns.
It is impossible to say whether this chance will be fulfilled, 
or to what extent, but the symposium offered all of us in 
attendance sufficient reason to be optimistic. José Jorge 
mendoza and Grant J. Silva are perhaps each a case in 
point. Both are sons of undocumented immigrants and 
have had to negotiate life on the borderlands, and they 
have both dedicated their careers so far to examining the 
ethics of immigration and civic belonging. they are not the 
only philosophers to address these issues, of course, but 
they may be the only ones in the literature who understand 
first-hand the moral conflicts that are particular to the U.S.-
mexico border, background understanding which promises 
to radically complicate the standard literature. Importantly, 
mendoza and Silva are not changing the subject—i.e., 
switching from universal, philosophical questions to 
particular, sociological questions—or ignoring the standard 
philosophical literature. Instead, they are informing it with 
different lived experiences and demonstrating not only that 
Latinos/as could use philosophy to address issues close to 
home, but also that philosophy could use Latinos/as to better 
understand issues that for the majority of philosophers in the 
United States are far from home.
What incorporating the Latino/a experience offers is not a 
chance to realize a distinct kind of philosophy—an alternative 
to Western philosophy—but a chance to enlarge philosophy 
by representing differences within it. to recognize Latino/a 
philosophy, or ethnic philosophies more generally, is simply 
to make visible an aspect of philosophy that has been covered 
up by the overly simple philosophy/not-philosophy binary. It 
is an almost aesthetic—not just epistemic or socio-political—
call to recognize the variety already within philosophy.7 And it 
is the basis, as Gracia says, of a truly comparative philosophy, 
for although “comparative philosophy was born from the 
desire to see similarities between the great philosophies 
developed in different parts of the world, . . . as important as 
the similarities are the differences.”
But Latino/a philosophy doesn’t represent only a chance; 
it also represents the possibility and actuality of exclusion. 
more specifically, assuming that it is right to say that Latino/a 
philosophy represents a difference within philosophy, 
it represents the possibility of internal exclusions, which 
as mariana ortega and rocío Zambrana demonstrated in 
their papers, are harder to track and easier to ignore. the 
challenge is to conceptualize and defend Latino/a identity 
or group politics without generating new exclusions or 
ultimatums in the process. on the one hand, it seems that if 
we want to avoid all exclusions that arise from recognizing 
group identities, or if we want to stop reproducing 
oppressive projects and traditions in new systems of 
categorization, we have to do away with group identities 
altogether.8 on the other hand, however, both ortega and 
Zambrana acknowledge that defending group rights requires 
recognizing group identities. So, while destabilizing identity 
categories may be a step in the right direction, leading us 
away from those internal exclusions which are generated by 
recognizing group identities, we should not do away with 
them altogether. And we don’t need to; what we need are 
better conceptions of group identity that recognize both 
internal differences and the role of identity categories in 
social, political, and economic reality. 
the arrival of Latino/a philosophy, then, represents a chance, 
a cause, and a warning. It is a chance to contextualize 
philosophy, in part to incorporate the concerns of Latinos/
as into the core identity of the discipline and to be more 
welcoming to future Latinos/as (the cause). But it comes 
with a caveat: as several of the speakers cautioned, both in 
conversation and in their presentations, it is important not 
to generate new stereotypes and forms of exclusion in the 
struggle for recognition. It is important to realize that although 
the participants of the symposium undeniably share a distinct 
ethnic identity, which on this occasion left a particular stamp 
on the philosophy I have tried to summarize briefly, it is only 
a family resemblance and not immune to the possibility 
of internal exclusions. We should not be left thinking, for 
instance, that one is contributing to Latino/a philosophy only 
if one is responding to the problem of underrepresentation, 
Latino/a identity, the decontextualization and colonization 
of philosophy, immigration, or the identity of Latino/a 
philosophy. those may be the shared interests, approaches, 
and circumstances that loosely define Latino/a philosophy 
today, and which distinguish it from the philosophies of 
different ethnic groups at different times. But they do not 
constitute the definition of Latino/a philosophy. Nor do we 
want to create a new ultimatum for up-and-coming Latino/a 
philosophers—namely, represent your ethnic identity or get 
out. 
this warning is related to another, equally important hazard 
that Gregory Pappas made clear to us. Although Pappas 
agreed with everyone that philosophy is demographically 
challenged and needs to be contextualized, he argued 
that “not all contextualisms are created equal” and that we 
ought to avoid “contextualism gone wild.” that is, although 
contextualizing philosophy is an important aim, we should 
not lose sight of the universal aspiration of philosophy for the 
sake of a purely social or political goal. What philosophy needs 
from Latinos/as are significant philosophical contributions, 
not a political revolution disguised as philosophy. He argues, 
moreover, that politicizing philosophy too much will not only 
be counterproductive—in the end, those in the mainstream 
would dismiss such efforts as “insular, provincial, separatist, 
narrow, and political”—but that doing so is also unnecessary. 
If the contextualist is right in claiming that we can’t but 
philosophize from and within our historical context, and 
that one’s circumstances inevitably leave their stamp on 
philosophy, then any philosophy by those who are politically 
and professionally marginalized will help. Philosophy doesn’t 
have to be polemical or politically charged to problematize 
the canon and change it from within, and more importantly, 
it is often more successful when it tries not to be.
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About this Pappas is right: it is important not to forget that 
the effort to realize an autochthonous Latino/a philosophy 
can undermine itself by becoming too ideological and thus 
un-philosophical. But, if the symposium proved anything, 
it showed that having a cultural or political agenda in 
philosophy is not incompatible with doing philosophy well. 
What the possibility of Latino/a philosophy can teach us is 
that the self-referential nature of philosophy might include 
ethnic identity as one more relevant difference within 
philosophy—alongside gender, for example—and that the 
problem of marginalization in philosophy is a philosophical 
problem in need of a solution, not just a sociological or 
administrative problem. And while it’s true that a philosophy 
whose only aim is to achieve some political agenda is not 
philosophy, what all the speakers demonstrated throughout 
the symposium is that having an agenda doesn’t necessarily 
compromise the aspiration to universality or dull the critical 
edge, which, more than anything, distinguishes philosophy 
from other disciplines. the symposium was ultimately an 
opportunity to hear from great philosophers who happen to 
be Latino/a, and the excellence of whose work was in no way 
compromised by the awareness that our coming together 
was a major moment in the process of defining Latino/a 
philosophy.
noteS
1. All quotes are from drafts of the papers presented at the 
symposium unless otherwise specified.
2. one question to ask is whether ethnic differences matter to 
philosophical truth. to answer this question, though, we should be 
able to say what an ethnicity is—what distinguishes it, for instance, 
from race—and what philosophy is. Further, the phrase “Latino/a 
philosophy” suggests that we can define “Latino/a”—Is it an ethnic 
or racial identity? one or a cluster of identities? A meaningful 
identity in Latin America or just in the United States?—and, as we 
have seen in the previous two paragraphs, that we can or should 
distinguish it from “Latin American,” “Hispanic,” or, say, “mexican-
American” or “Chicano.”
3. Vargas adds that the situation is much worse for Latinos/as born 
in the United States and that “anecdotal data suggests that a 
non-trivial percentage of Latinos in the APA data are foreign-born 
nationals who do not identify as Latino.” the data from the APA are 
from February 2013.
4. Again, the numbers are misleading, since they don’t highlight 
that there are more than twenty-eight cities—defined as cities 
of more than 100,000 people—in the United States with majority 
Latino populations, or that 40 percent of California is Latino/a. 
In other words, the data don’t quite capture the degree of 
underrepresentation in certain regions.
5. Alcoff offered this phrase first in her presidential address to 
the eastern division of the APA in december 2012. the address 
can be heard at http://alcoff.com/2012-american-philosophical-
association-presidential-address.
6. In support of Schutte’s claim that philosophy does not work in 
isolation from the rest of our social practices, mendieta would 
add that “[s]ociety in general has become cynical and skeptical of 
identity-claims, especially when these are supposed to entitle the 
claimant to some sort of social benefit.” See eduardo mendieta, 
“the ‘Second reconquista’, or Why Should a ‘Hispanic’ Become a 
Philosopher?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27, no. 11 (2001): 14.
7. Schutte would agree that there is an aesthetic dimension to 
diversity. See “Negotiating Latina Identities,” in Latin American 
Philosophy for the 21st Century, eds. Jorge J. e. Gracia and 
elizabeth millán-Zaibert (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004): 341.
8. to illustrate how recognizing group differences leads to 
internal exclusions, ortega cites a famous Supreme Court case, 
DeGraffenreid vs. General Motors, in which a group of black 
women sued General motors for discriminatory practices in 
hiring black women. “Famously,” she said, “the court ruled that 
the company hired white women, thus was not guilty of sex 
discrimination and that the company hired black men and so 
was not guilty of race discrimination.” Because the court was 
focused on sex discrimination (gender), on the one hand, and 
race discrimination (racial identity) on the other, it was blind to 
the unique discrimination against black women (a third category 
besides race and gender). Likewise, Zambrana told us how the 
cultural nationalism that defined the process of Puerto rican 
self-identification in the middle of the twentieth century aimed 
to homogenize what it meant to be culturally Puerto rican and 
was thus exclusionary. For example, because cultural nationalists 
romanticized their Spanish heritage, they obscured the history 
of resistance against Spanish hegemony and marginalized those 
who continued to identify with the resistance.
Interview with José Medina
Natalie Cisneros
gettySbUrg College
José medina is professor of philosophy and director of 
graduate studies at Vanderbilt University. He is the author 
of The Unity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: Necessity, 
Intelligibility, and Normativity (SUNY, 2002), Language, 
Key Concepts in Philosophy Series (Continuum, 2005), and 
Speaking From Elsewhere: A New Contextualist Perspective 
on Meaning, Identity, and Discursive Agency (SUNY, 2006). 
His most recent book, The Epistemology of Resistance: 
Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and 
Resistant Imaginations (oxford, 2012), winner of the 2013 
North American Society for Social Philosophy Book Award, 
discusses the epistemic aspects of race and gender 
oppression and explores avenues of resisting this injustice. 
this project, like much of his other work, underscores his 
influential voice in contemporary conversations surrounding 
race and gender theory, philosophy of language, and social 
epistemology. Along with these contributions, he is a leading 
thinker in the incorporation of Latina/o and Latin American 
philosophical perspectives into contemporary philosophical 
debates, especially in the areas of epistemology and 
philosophy of language.
I came to know José as a graduate student at Vanderbilt, 
where he directed my dissertation. His mentorship inspired 
and made possible my graduate work on questions of race, 
gender, oppression, and resistance, and he and his work 
continue to serve as major influences on my own projects. 
In this interview, José discusses how his intellectual and 
political interests emerged, and how they have evolved 
throughout his career. He also speaks to the current state 
of the field, including the contributions of Latina/o and 
Latin American thought, the relevance (or irrelevance) of 
disciplinary and subdisciplinary divisions, and the work that 
remains to be done in order to resist epistemic injustice in 
philosophical communities.
***
natalie Cisneros: Can you tell us a little bit about your early 
experiences growing up and how they may have influenced 
your work? How did you come to study philosophy?
José medina: I grew up in Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, 
during the last years of the Franco dictatorship and the early 
years of the democratic transformation. It was a time of 
political turmoil, a time where you could still feel the political 
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repression and the social silences in all areas of life, public 
and private; but it was also a time of vibrant resistance, 
full of political possibilities, with the formation of strong 
communities that were articulating political demands and 
denouncing their oppression publically for the first time in 
Spain, and philosophers had an important role to play there. 
I am thinking in particular about the early Spanish feminists 
and queer activists. the demonstrations, the performances, 
the town-hall meetings, the critical discussions of that time 
taught me that sexuality could be a site of resistance and 
political contestation, and more generally that issues of 
identity were at the same time deeply personal and deeply 
political. one of the attractions for me to move to the United 
States in the early 1990s was to come to a place with a longer 
history of political struggles such as the fight for women’s 
rights and for GLBt rights, although interestingly I found that 
American society was not changing and advancing on these 
issues as quickly and aggressively as Spain. But I moved 
to the US mainly for academic reasons. I came to Chicago 
to attend graduate school at Northwestern University and 
to work on issues of meaning and normativity, which for 
me were from the beginning also issues of identity and of 
political struggle. I had the fortune of receiving my graduate 
training in a place where I could do serious, specialized work 
in Wittgenstein and in critical theory at the same time.
nC: It’s fascinating that your decision to go to graduate 
school at Northwestern was motivated by your personal and 
philosophical interests in identity and political struggles, 
especially since this move, as you suggest, complicated 
and broadened your experience and understanding of these 
issues. How does Spain and your identity as an immigrant, 
and in general, influence your work?
Jm: Like my sexual identity, my ethnic and national identity 
has been something that left me out of the mainstream in 
the United States; and it is also something that has shaped 
my work and how I approach philosophy. Although not fitting 
in anywhere completely, being multi-national and multi-
lingual allowed me to articulate and approach things from 
different perspectives, to speak from elsewhere, as I call 
it. I have been very fortunate to find welcoming immigrant 
communities in which I feel at home, both in philosophy 
and outside philosophy, and both in the United States and 
outside the United States. I am thinking about transnational 
and global feminist and queer communities, but also about 
Latina/o communities—and I think it is important not to 
think of Latina/os as forming a single group, but rather, as 
a collection of communities, as a family (as Jorge Gracia 
would put it) or as a network of communities brought 
together by linguistic and cultural differences and historical 
experiences.
nC: Given your positionality within this network of Latina/o 
and queer communities, and the historical and current 
climate for women, people of color, and sexual minorities in 
professional philosophy, can you talk about your experiences 
in the discipline? What has changed since you entered into 
the profession, how do you think it needs to continue to 
evolve, and is that different from where you see it headed?
Jm: Women, people of color, and sexual minorities are 
definitely better represented and more visible now than they 
were twenty years ago. But their representation and visibility 
are often constrained in problematic ways: for example, 
they are often relegated to certain areas (such as applied 
philosophy or feminism or race theory). And of course people 
of color are still heavily underrepresented in philosophy. 
the work of philosophers of color is receiving now more 
recognition and that is wonderful; but this recognition 
is also constrained, only given in special or applied areas 
or reserved for a very select few whose work is read and 
engaged by the mainstream. only the work of very few 
philosophers of color (such as Linda Alcoff, Charles mills, or 
Anthony Appiah) is discussed in areas such as epistemology 
and philosophy of language. Something that needs to 
happen more systematically, and not just sporadically, is for 
philosophers of color and their contributions to be able to 
reach and have an impact in core areas of philosophy. It is 
important that now more and more people are discussing 
issues of gender and race in these areas, so that these issues 
are no longer taken up only by racial and sexual minorities 
and they are no longer perceived as issues of special interest 
to some, but as central issues of interest to all. think, for 
example, of recent discussions of race in epistemology by 
people like miranda Fricker, or recent discussions of hate 
speech and racial slurs in philosophy of language by people 
like ernest Lepore, rebecca Kukla, and mark Lance. At the 
same time, although it is a great step forward that these 
issues are addressed by all kinds of philosophers, there is 
also the danger of getting validation only when mainstream 
voices speak for us or speak to us. It is important to give 
credit and recognition to the long history of achievements 
by feminist philosophers and race theorists because 
sometimes their insights and provocative suggestions are 
appropriated by others without more acknowledgement 
or engagement than a passing remark or a footnote. to 
counter the marginalization of nonmainstream philosophical 
voices, it is important to have initiatives that bring minority 
groups together, celebrate their achievements, and nurture 
the next generation of scholars. In this sense, initiatives 
such as mariana ortega’s Latina Feminism roundtable at 
John Carroll University and the Collegium of Black Women 
Philosophers created and led by Kathryn Gines at Penn State 
are invaluable. It is also important to have initiatives that put 
these minority philosophical communities in conversation 
with other groups (including mainstream ones). one example 
of this is The Latina Dialogues, a Latina feminism conference 
that Andrea Pitts and I are hosting at Vanderbilt University, 
where prominent Latina feminists will discuss their ongoing 
research with scholars in other areas, drawing connections, 
contrasts, and mutual challenges.
nC: Your commitment to resisting the marginalization of 
diverse voices is evidenced by your important service to the 
profession, including The Latina Dialogues conference as 
well as your service on the executive committee of the APA’s 
eastern division and the APA’s ad hoc committee on sexual 
harassment, as well as your research, which often takes up 
these concrete political problems of representation and 
subjugated knowledges and explores avenues of resisting 
the marginalization of the voices of women, people of color, 
and sexual minorities. this is a concern of your most recent 
book, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial 
Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations 
(oxford, 2012). Can you talk a bit about this project? How did 
it form? What are its central questions and motivations?
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Jm: the focus of the book is the epistemic side of oppression 
(social silences, bodies of ignorance and patterns of 
distortion, inabilities to listen and understand certain people 
and certain things, epistemic vices of all sorts, etc.); but 
more specifically, the book tries to uncover the different 
forms of resistance available to us to fight against the kinds 
of epistemic exclusion and marginalization associated with 
racism, sexism, and homophobia. I discuss how to resist 
epistemic injustices in ordinary interactions in our daily lives; 
but I also address how ordinary forms of contestation relate 
to social movements of resistance and political struggles 
that call for structural and institutional transformations. the 
book wrestles with the ways in which political, ethical, and 
epistemological questions are intertwined and have bearing 
upon one another. more specifically, it tries to contribute 
to what might be called political epistemology, which 
feminist epistemologists (such as standpoint theorists) and 
race theorists (such as Charles mills) have been engaged 
in for a long time. I bring to these debates the polyphonic 
contextualism and kaleidoscopic perspectivalism that I have 
articulated in my previous work in philosophy of language 
(especially in Speaking from Elsewhere). Like my previous 
work, this book in social epistemology is “methodologically 
promiscuous” and combines various methods and 
philosophical styles that are not simply merged, but brought 
into critical dialogue with one another. my discussions 
engage with the recent literature in virtue epistemology and 
epistemic injustice, but they draw from bodies of literature that 
have been underrepresented in epistemology: pragmatism, 
critical race theory, queer theory, Latina feminism (from Sor 
Juana to Linda Alcoff), and transnational and women color 
feminisms (from Patricia Hill Collins to Uma Narayan). these 
bodies of literature are rarely brought together and put in 
conversation; they often only intersect or touch each other at 
the edges (when they do not simply ignore one another and 
their connections). It is difficult to bring all these different 
discussions together because there are terminological, 
methodological, and substantive differences. I don’t know if 
I have done justice (epistemic justice!) to all the voices and 
perspectives I have drawn from, but the risk was worth taking 
in order to bring all of them to bear on issues of silencing 
and epistemic marginalization; there was the need for a 
book-length treatment of the epistemic side of oppression 
that connected all these different vibrant discussions.
nC: risky, but also incredibly philosophically and politically 
fruitful! Your commitment to exploring the links between 
ideas and thinkers not often brought together—what you 
term “methodological promiscuity”—is also reflected in these 
different fields in which you work, including philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of language, and critical race and gender 
theory. Can you tell us about what you find difficult and 
productive about working across these areas of philosophy?
Jm: Problems in philosophy often span across different 
areas and levels of discussion, and their narrow and rigid 
compartmentalization results in impoverished analyses blind 
to all kinds of important connections and implications. the 
issues of silence and marginalization of voices I am interested 
in, for example, are ethical and political problems, but 
they are also problems in epistemology and philosophy of 
language. Bringing together two or more areas of philosophy 
is always a difficult challenge, but the cross-fertilization of 
fields can be incredibly productive and lead to new avenues 
of research (think, for example, of ernest Sosa’s work in 
virtue epistemology). maintaining an up-to-date mastery of 
multiple fields is not easy, but even more difficult is being 
able to engage multiple audiences. When you work on 
epistemological issues concerning race and gender, you run 
the risk of losing the attention of those who are interested 
only in epistemology (whatever it means to be interested 
only in epistemology, in pure epistemology). But it is a risk 
worth taking. We need to keep trying to make connections 
across fields because it is our intellectual responsibility to 
explore these connections. If it is a scandal, as many have 
argued, that for a long time white philosophers writing on 
justice in the United States ignored the issue of racism, isn’t 
it also a scandal that until recently philosophers of language 
remained silent about hate speech or that epistemologists 
didn’t address the issue of epistemic exclusion?
nC: You also work on major figures associated with the 
“analytic,” “continental” and “pragmatist” traditions (including 
in your most recent book, for example, where you productively 
draw on Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Addams, among 
others). In some ways, drawing together these philosophical 
traditions is just as difficult and potentially politically fraught 
as your work bringing together epistemological concerns 
and critical race and gender theories. But it is also equally 
vital. How do you understand the distinctions often made 
between these traditions? Why are you interested in drawing 
from each of them?
Jm: I am a problem-oriented philosopher and draw from 
whatever resources might be useful to deal with a question. 
Very often philosophers in different traditions are dealing 
with similar and related questions, so why not explore those 
connections? Why not use their analyses and arguments 
in tandem (enriching each other, correcting each other, or 
simply challenging each other)? But given my contextualist 
sensibilities, of course I do not think that ideas and arguments 
should be simply taken out of context, disregarding the 
dynamics that shaped their trajectory. Sensitivity to context 
is key for a proper understanding and for responsible use 
of philosophical resources, but contexts can—and often 
should—be connected and put in critical dialogue with 
each other. It is also part of our intellectual responsibility as 
philosophers to call into question traditional and disciplinary 
boundaries, to challenge received interpretations and 
disciplinary habits, and to interrogate the lack of dialogue 
between traditions or between philosophical perspectives. 
nC: this critical interrogation of traditional boundaries in your 
work is also evident in your work on philosophical traditions 
often excluded from the canon of academic philosophy 
in the United States and the West more broadly. many of 
your works, including your most recent book, engages 
Latina/o and Latin American thought in particular, including 
contemporary Latina feminists such as Linda Alcoff and maría 
Lugones, and figures from the history of Latin American 
philosophy, including José martí and Sor Juana Inés de la 
Cruz. How did you become interested in working on Latina/o 
and Latin American thought? What do you think Latina/o and 
Latin American philosophy contribute to the contemporary 
landscape of philosophy in the United States?
Jm: I received very limited exposure to Latin American 
philosophy in Spain, but I was very interested from the 
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beginning in Latina feminist and queer thinkers, including the 
very early ones such as Sor Juana. I continued reading classic 
and contemporary Latin American philosophers when I was 
in graduate school in Chicago, but it was mainly self-taught 
because I didn’t have anybody to guide me or to explore 
those interests with me in philosophy. Interdisciplinary 
reading groups in Latin American philosophy helped me to 
identify authors and ideas that were useful for the issues I 
was working on and enabled me to approach the debates 
I was engaged with in different terms. there is still an 
unexplored wealth of ideas in Latin American philosophy 
that can illuminate and enrich many philosophical debates 
in the United States. People like Jorge Gracia and ofelia 
Schutte have been pioneers in calling attention to the history 
of Latin American philosophy and using its resources. there 
is a new generation of Latina/o scholars (such as Andrea 
Pitts) doing superb historical work and bringing classic 
figures in this tradition to bear on contemporary debates. 
there is also the ground-breaking work of philosophers such 
as Linda Alcoff and eduardo mendieta who have combined 
Latin American philosophy and critical theory; and there is 
much more to be done in following their footsteps. But if 
there is a single school of thought that I want to highlight 
for its originality and its contributions to the contemporary 
philosophical landscape, it is Latina feminism because, 
with their heterogeneous and often conflicting voices, 
Latina feminists have raised challenging questions and 
offered provocative suggestions about identity, relationality, 
intersectionality, solidarity, social justice, and community 
formation—questions and suggestions that have created 
an agenda for ongoing and future debates. And I think 
the next generation of Latina feminists will continue and 
deepen this trajectory of highly original and provocative 
research. the cutting-edge work of young Latina feminists 
on intersectionality is already breaking new ground and 
opening new avenues of interdisciplinary research, bringing 
together race, nationality, class, sexuality, and other aspects 
of identity in very productive and provocative ways. A prime 
example of this is your forthcoming book on immigration, The 
“Illegal Alien”: An Intersectional and Genealogical Approach 
(Columbia University Press). 
nC: Given the contributions of Latina/o philosophy, 
and Latina feminism in particular, to thinking through 
contemporary philosophical and political problems, can 
you say more about the possibilities and opportunities for 
dialogue between Latin American philosophical thought 
and european or American philosophical thought? What do 
you find fruitful about reading thinkers from these traditions 
together?
Jm: the problem is that the dialogue has always been 
going in one direction: Latin American philosophers have 
always been responding to european and Anglo-American 
philosophers, reacting to their ideas, integrating them, 
applying them, offering alternatives, etc. But the dialogue 
has rarely taken place in the other direction: for the most 
part, european and Anglo-American philosophers have 
simply ignored philosophical discussions in Latin America. 
things have been changing a bit recently with a few Latin 
American philosophers acquiring prominence and being 
taken seriously. But there is still a long way to go until there 
is a truly reciprocal dialogue, and the work to be done 
cannot be done exclusively by Latina/o philosophers in the 
United States working across traditions. others have to do 
their part as well. With recent demographic and geopolitical 
changes, there seem to be new curricular demands for Latin 
American philosophy, and this can help change things by 
giving more visibility and recognition to this tradition and 
making it available to new generations. I think one of the 
valuable consequences of reading Anglo-American and 
Latin-American philosophers together (John dewey and 
José martí, for example) is that it helps you situate their 
perspectives and it gives you a good sense of the diversity 
of American philosophical voices and the truly pluralistic 
nature of philosophy in the Americas. It also brings issues of 
coloniality, post-coloniality, and imperialism to the fore in a 
way that contrasts sharply with the invisibility of these issues 
when Anglo-American and european philosophers talk 
among themselves. this is another important critical payoff.
nC: What is the direction of your work now? What are the 
questions you continue to be interested in working on?
Jm: I find myself these days occupied with responding to the 
critics of my last book. I am honored that the book is getting 
so much attention and that there are already some objections 
and critical challenges raised about my view of epistemic 
responsibility and my notions of “meta-insensitivity” and 
“meta-blindness.” taking time to respond to my critics is 
an opportunity to clarify and elaborate further the ideas of 
The Epistemology of Resistance, and this helps me with the 
development of my new projects because they draw from 
my analysis of epistemic injustice and epistemic resistance. 
the focus of my current projects is the imagination. In 
particular, I am interested in how we can take responsibility, 
individually and collectively, for our imagination and its limits. 
these projects connect the literature on the imagination in 
philosophy of mind, epistemology, and social theory. the 
book project I am planning to develop first has the working 
title “Imagination and the ethics of Acknowledgement” and it 
draws from Wittgenstein and the epistemology of ignorance. 
As I conceive it now, the book will develop a Wittgensteinian 
view of the imagination that calls attention to the opacity and 
self-ignorance constitutive of our subjectivity and agency. 
through this Wittgensteinian exploration of the personal 
and interpersonal aspects of our imaginative capacities 
and their limits, I want to flesh out my notion of shared 
epistemic responsibility. this demands from us that we 
subject ourselves to critical scrutiny in interactive practices 
of contestation so that we can recognize our blindspots and 
how they obscure some aspects of our own experiences 
and of our interactions with others, making problematic the 
intelligibility of certain domains of human experience and 
social life. I want to develop these ideas more specifically 
with respect to the racial imagination. But I think that this 
will become a separate book or a collection of essays in 
which I offer an account of the different communicative 
and epistemic injustices associated with racialized ways of 
imagining. I am interested in developing an analysis and 
critique of different kinds of racial insensitivity and their 
defense mechanisms, exploring ways in which we can 
resist them through improved communicative dynamics and 
transformed practices of interaction. I think about this project 
under the rubric “resisting the racial Imagination.”
nC: In light of your continuing work on philosophical and 
political questions of oppression and resistance, can you 
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talk a bit about what you see as the role of philosophy in 
contemporary society? What does philosophical work have 
to do with our political, ethical, and everyday lives?
Jm: that is a really important and a really difficult question. 
one of the results of the professionalization and narrow 
specialization of philosophers is that our work often becomes 
too far removed from ordinary affairs, too detached from 
the lives and concerns of ordinary people. But we have 
an obligation to connect our philosophical reflections (no 
matter how abstract they get) back to real life and real 
people; not that each of us needs to do this in every essay 
or in every class, but we collectively have the responsibility 
to show how our critical reflections bear on people’s lives 
and problems. For me, philosophy should be a critical 
activity that offers new avenues for thinking and acting to 
people. It is in this sense that I am drawn to philosophers 
like Wittgenstein and Jane Addams, whose philosophical 
reflections begin and end with actual practices and people’s 
lived experiences; that should the starting point and the end 
point of our philosophical exercise and in between what we 
need to produce and work with is perplexity, that is, a deep 
interrogation of how we do things and how we think and 
feel, an interrogation that interrupts the flow of familiarity 
and obviousness of our lives, making the familiar unfamiliar 
and the obvious bizarre. the emphasis placed on the critical 
potential of perplexity by philosophers like Addams and 
Wittgenstein (and of course many others since Socrates) 
points in the direction of processes of self-estrangement 
and self-questioning in which we look at ourselves with fresh 
eyes, and we become capable of calling into question things 
we have taken for granted and have become invisible to us, 
being then able to recognize limitations and possibilities for 
transformation and improvement. of course, making people 
perplexed is not enough. Philosophers (in collaboration with 
other scholars and also with artists and activists) need to find 
ways of making that perplexity productive in leading people 
to think and act better, not just in more sophisticated ways, 
but also and more importantly in ethically, politically, and 
epistemically responsible ways. Ways of doing this can be 
found in the critical methodologies of feminist theory, queer 
theory, and critical race theory. these are some of the most 
innovative theories philosophy has offered in recent years 
and they have a tremendous transformative potential for our 
political, ethical, and everyday lives.
nC: As we’ve discussed, in your written work you actively 
and critically interrogate philosophical, political, and 
epistemological assumptions. In doing so, you engage in 
this important work of making your readers more perplexed 
while asking them to think and act in more responsible ways. 
How do your work in teaching and mentoring play into this 
practice of philosophy for you? 
Jm: I cannot think of philosophy without teaching as an 
essential part, whether in the classroom, reading groups, 
workshops, conferences, or in more informal ways. 
Philosophy is a self-critical exercise, but for me it is not 
something that can be done by individuals in isolation 
because it requires a practice of mutual interrogation and 
challenge; it involves learning from others and their critical 
exercises as well as offering our own reflections for the 
learning of others. one thing that I think philosophy as a 
critical activity should help us do is to bring teaching and 
activism closer together, so that our philosophical activities 
become oriented toward the critique and transformation of 
both theories and practices at the same time. this aspiration 
is something that have in common with all the authors I draw 
from: pragmatists, feminists, queer theorists, and critical 
race theorists. the ways in which these different theorists 
practice philosophy provide useful paradigms or models for 
how to do philosophy in a critical and transformative way, 
working toward making a difference in people’s lives.
BooK reVIeW
A Cadre of Color in the Sea of 
Philosophical Homogeneity: On the 
Marginalization of African Americans and 
Latino/as in Academic Philosophy
A Review of Reframing the Practice of 
Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge
George Yancy, ed. (Albany: SUNY, 2012). 393 pages.
reviewed by Grant J. Silva
marqUette UniverSity
For readers interested in acquiring insight into the plight 
of people of color in academic philosophy, particularly 
the predicament of African Americans and Latino/as in the 
field, Reframing the Practice of Philosophy is incredibly 
illuminating while simultaneously upsetting. each essay 
tackles tough questions of inclusion and exclusion in ways 
that reveal an assortment of biases and structural flaws latent 
to professional philosophy. “the attempt to explore and 
explicate the lack of African Americans and Latinos/as in the 
field of philosophy,” Yancy writes, “actually resulted in a much 
broader and comprehensive text that uncovered complex 
and multifaceted issues such as alienation, institutional 
prejudices, insidious racism, canonical exclusion, linguistic 
exclusion, nonrecognition, disrespect, white hegemony 
and power, discursive silencing, philosophical territorial 
arrogance, and indignation” (2). the volume is a powerful, 
self-conscious, and exigent analysis of one of the whitest 
fields in academia. more honest conversations like this must 
take place in order for our field to reinvent itself along more 
equitable lines, assuming that this is indeed a collective goal.
Almost every essay addresses one or more of the above 
issues through insightful argumentation infused with 
autobiographic prose—a hallmark of several of Yancy’s 
volumes. the contributors comprise a prominent list of 
active Latino/a and Black voices in professional philosophy, 
many of whom specialized in more “mainstream” areas of 
philosophy prior to delving into such topics as philosophy of 
race, feminist theory, Latin American philosophy, Caribbean 
philosophy, Africana philosophy, and more. through their 
efforts, the volume asks meta-philosophical questions about 
the nature and practice of philosophical inquiry in societies 
shaped by legacies of racism and other forms of widespread, 
systematic oppression. How has the history of classical, 
institutional, and non-conscious forms of racism, particularly 
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that which targets Blacks and Hispanics, or, for the same 
reason, the blind commitment to a tradition that continually 
marginalizes minorities, women, and the philosophical topics 
pertinent to both, affected the conditions that make possible 
philosophical inquiry? How have the range of questions 
philosophers are willing to ask, the type of books they read, 
the kinds of people they listen to been shaped by the history 
of these forms of oppression and ignorance? this range of 
questioning alone makes the volume worth picking up.
Philosophers of color alive today will find the text a useful 
resource for dealing with some of the pressures and 
frustrations of academic life. In fact, the volume may serve 
as a springboard for voicing one’s opinion and (most likely) 
similar experiences. As Yancy explains, “I began to see just 
how important the text had become beyond the scope of 
low numbers, particularly in terms of the text’s forward-
looking dimensions. the text constitutes an important site—a 
textual balm of sorts—for blacks and Latino/as currently 
pursuing degrees in philosophy and who, as a result, may 
feel isolated, ‘out of place,’ and marginalized. moreover, the 
text speaks to future philosophers of color who might need 
confirmation of their sanity, a collective voice that says, ‘We 
also know your pain, your blues’” (2).
the dedication to “philosophers of color not yet born” adds 
a sense of urgency to the topics discussed throughout the 
volume, especially in light of changing demographics in the 
United States, which will undoubtedly bring more nonwhites 
into philosophy and expand the range of philosophical 
inquiry. If the critical thinking skills acquired in a philosophical 
education are a good thing, then more should be done 
to ensure that vast segments of the population, if not the 
majority, do not feel alienated from this field of study (this 
might actually serve to philosophy’s benefit in terms of 
institutional support and funding).
In terms of Latin American philosophy, Jorge J. e. Gracia 
describes the canonical marginalization of this sub-discipline 
as follows: “Latin American philosophy is a good example of 
a philosophy systematically excluded from both the Western 
and world philosophical canons as these are conceived in 
the United States. this claim . . . may be easily documented 
by looking at histories of philosophy, reference works, 
anthologies, philosophical societies, evaluating tools of 
philosophy as a field of learning, education programs such as 
the National endowment for the Humanities (NeH) seminars, 
Ph.d. dissertations in philosophy and common areas of 
specialization in the discipline, and the college curriculum (in 
the United States, philosophy is generally taught only at the 
college level)” (89). In his essay, Gracia quickly dismantles 
a veritable list of objections that would justify the exclusion 
of Latin American philosophy from the Western canon. 
However, the real reason, according to Gracia, stems from a 
blind commitment to tradition.
ofelia Schutte summarizes the reasons for the marginalization 
of Latinos/as in professional philosophy with three problems: 
(1) the Anglo/eurocentric orientation of philosophy, (2) the 
desire by “prestigious” philosophers to safeguard prestige 
(sometimes talked about in terms of “rigor”), and (3) the 
“we” of philosophy, or the fact that the mainstream academic 
philosophical community is a rather monochromatic 
bunch where people of color often feel second-class or 
unwelcomed (unless, of course, people of color are willing 
to “play the game” as it is). All of these arguments, Schutte 
explains, depend upon “extra-philosophical” factors that 
reveal implicit biases against Blacks and Latino/as in ways 
that perpetuate the whiteness of philosophy.
Charles mills explains that the entire discipline of philosophy is 
“inimical to the recognition of race.” He continues, “Philosophy 
is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent, the 
corporeal, the temporal, the material, to get at necessary, 
spiritual, eternal, ideal truths” (60). much of the difficulties 
engendered by the incorporation of marginalized voices 
and topics has to do with the subject matter of philosophical 
thought and its supposed universality. Philosophical truths 
are supposed to escape the realm of the particular and rise 
to a level of abstraction beyond cultural, ethnic, and racial 
particularities (59–60). With one intriguing sentence Bill e. 
Lawson captures the essence of this sentiment when he writes, 
“when race comes in the room, logic goes out the window” 
(197). the idea that race and logic are incompatible can mean 
that when discussions of race take place, conversation quickly 
deteriorates to irrational, emotion-driven fights. Put differently 
(and in terms that garner instantaneous philosophical capital 
in some circles), there cannot be any logos when speaking 
about ethnos.
thus, the volume highlights the subtle and not-so-subtle 
prejudices held by professional philosophers. Besides 
historical contingency, there are no good reasons as to why 
the concerns of people of color are ignored. Although their 
work aspires towards levels of abstraction that make universal 
truth claims possible, philosophers are nonetheless born 
into particular societies, cultures, and histories, all of which 
yield an assortment of racist or sexists leanings, cultural 
insensitivities, bias and jingoism, etc. Yancy thus endeavors 
to show how it is the case that “blacks and Latinos/as often 
experience nonacademic spaces and academic spaces as a 
distinction without a difference” (3).
Along these lines, the critical dimensions of the text are found 
in aggregate. Individually, the question of marginalization or 
specific examples of racist/sexist statements and attitudes 
may appear to be scandalous moral failures, the kind of 
material that gets talked about on national blogs and at 
APA meetings. Viewed piecemeal, these incidents and 
complaints appear sporadic and incidental. However, the 
forms of marginalization experienced by Latino/as and 
African Americans are manifold, often intersecting and 
widespread—this volume serves as proof. By allowing 
prominent thinkers to voice their experiences and concerns 
Yancy’s text allows for the emergence of patterns of 
systematic exclusion that venture beyond the incidental: 
“As the text continued to take shape, what also began to 
emerge was a parallel between many of the issues that 
black and Latino/a bodies experience within the everyday 
world of social perception as linked to pervasive de facto 
racism, and the refined and intellectually highfalutin world 
of professional philosophy” (2). reiterating the goal of the 
text, Yancy writes, “[the] goal was to create a critical space 
where both groups [African Americans and Latino/as] would 
come together to discuss critically a collectively important 
defining theme, a common problem—our marginalization 
within the profession of philosophy, which is one of those 
‘inappropriate’ philosophical subjects” (1).
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Yancy revels in a bit of ambiguity at the end of this quote. 
Not only is the subject matter of philosophy at stake, i.e., the 
range of questions philosophers think about and the ways 
in which philosophical issues pertinent to Latino/as and 
African Americans are often relegated to the philosophical 
wayside, but also at stake is the question of philosophical 
agency, i.e., whether or not Blacks and Hispanics constitute 
true philosophical “subjects.” Central to the volume is the 
assumption that philosophical inquiry is pertinent to what it 
means to be human, a natural outgrowth of having critical 
reflective skills. to deny the ability to practice philosophy, 
or to impose terms that make a fetish of rigor, tradition, and 
prestige, is to deny human subjectivity and autonomy. It is 
to say to Blacks and Latino/as that philosophy cannot take 
place on their terms.
donna-dale marcano’s wonderful contribution, “re-
reading Plato’s Symposium through the Lens of a Black 
Woman,” lends support at this point. marcano’s reading of 
Plato’s Symposium compares the character Alcibiades as 
a stand in for black women in philosophy. Both attempt to 
negotiate their relationship with philosophy (or Socrates) in 
ways that cannot divest themselves of the particularities of 
their existence. She writes, “does philosophy fail some of 
us then? Yes! It fails those of us who understand that we 
are particularly situated. We are particularly situated in our 
desires, in our communities, in our race, in our genders, 
in our loves. For this, black women’s intellectual work that 
engages their racialized and gendered perspectives and 
which aims to take account of the social and political context 
in which these perspectives take shape are often viewed as 
so particular as to be of no philosophical value” (232).
Jacqueline Scott’s essay, “toward a Place Where I Can Bring 
All of me,” speaks towards this notion when comparing the 
“traditional” view of the self as afforded by the history of 
philosophy, and the more complex, “impure” understanding 
of the self provided by life. She writes, “We need to conceive 
of a philosophy that is in the service of life—in the service 
of the complex, multifarious, incoherent lives most people 
really live, and we need to convey this in both our research 
and teaching” (220).
Nelson maldonado-torres explains the way in which his 
studies of Frantz Fanon allowed him to approach a conception 
of “decolonization as first philosophy,” which breaks with 
the idea that some people are subjects of knowledge while 
others are mere objects in need of dominance. He writes, 
“the fundamental axes of reflection about human reality 
are grounded in the human-to-human relation, and that the 
primary questions out of which philosophy itself emerges 
are motivated not so much by wonder in the face of nature, 
but by desire for inter-human contact and scandal in the 
face of the violation of that possibility. this means that the 
telos of thinking, if there is any, is the struggle against 
dehumanization, understood as the affirmation of sociality 
and the negation of its negation. I refer to the negation of 
sociality as coloniality and to its negation and overcoming as 
decoloniality” (261).
Lawson writes something similar: “our colleagues are 
not idiots. they are trained to solve problems. Like most 
people they will work to solve a problem if they think that 
it is important. If they think that racism in the profession is 
a problem, they will begin to work with their own and their 
colleague’s racism and sexism. No person of color can force 
them to work to change the game or their attitudes. If they 
think that blacks are indeed inferior intellectually, then they 
will feel no compulsion to change the game” (197). drawing 
from John Hope Franklin’s “the dilemma of the American 
Negro Scholar,” Lawson continues by stating that if there 
are white philosophers passionate about the elimination of 
disrespectful practices in academic philosophy, they must 
realize that the respect owed to black scholars is connected 
to the type of respect black people receive outside of 
academia. In a powerful line, Lawson writes, “It has been 
a truism that a black person being respected in one arena 
of social interaction gives us no hint of how he or she will 
be respect [sic] in others. However, respect must begin at 
home” (197).
By rethinking the agents responsible for philosophical 
thought, the volume attempts to “reframe” the practice of 
philosophy. this process “steps back and takes another 
look, realizing that the current frame excludes all that 
does not fit with the demarcated limits of that frame.” “In 
fact,” as Yancy continues, “that which is outside the frame 
is constituted as . . . unintelligible and ersatz. this form of 
framing actually deforms, delimits, and truncates the very 
power of philosophical imaginings. to reframe the current 
practices of philosophy, then, functions to reveal the limits 
of its current practices, its current assumptions, its current 
conceptual allegiances, and its current self-images. the aim 
is to expand the hermeneutic horizon of what is possible, 
philosophically” (5).
Yet the process of reframing philosophy remains difficult 
when philosophers inherit forms of prejudice and ignorance 
ingrained throughout their societies. Yancy writes, 
“Philosophical academic spaces are . . . continuous with 
everyday, politically invested, racially grounded, prejudicial, 
social spaces. Such normative (white) academic spaces 
are shot through with much of the same racist toxicity that 
configures black and brown bodies as outside the normative 
(white) demos” (2). returning to Lawson’s essay, his point was 
to note that African Americans will not acquire philosophical 
clout until Black people, as a whole, are respected as 
full, rational agents. this starts at home and in our own 
departments. returning to maldonado-torres’s essay, his 
understanding of philosophy necessitates reciprocal social 
exchanges that assume co-subjectivity; to deny this is to 
colonize the mind of others and even the self (since one is 
denies the possibility for dialogue and instead supplies only 
monologue). returning to Scott’s essay, philosophy should 
be a place where a person does not have to sacrifice one’s 
cultural, ethnic, or racial particularity to reach standards set 
by racist.
obviously, white allies will find much value in the text. more 
importantly, white philosophers who fail to see the importance 
of diversification would also benefit from reading the text. 
At the very least, the volume succeeds in placing the onus 
upon those who fail to see the importance of philosophical 
diversification to justify their stance. Along these lines, several 
contributors provide interesting arguments that explain why 
academic philosophy, as a whole, fails to take seriously the 
philosophical questions pertinent to people of color or even 
make difficult one’s personal existence inside the field. one 
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could only imagine how the text would be improved if it went 
beyond a black/brown binary to include people of Asian and 
indigenous descent (among others). Nonetheless, that form 
of exclusion sets the stage for a new volume expanding this 
discussion in ways beyond the confines of this volume.
ArtICLeS
Seriousness, Irony, and Cultural Politics: 
A Defense of Jorge Portilla
Francisco Gallegos
georgetoWn UniverSity
Nearly sixty years after the publication of the Phenomenology 
of Relajo, the work of Jorge Portilla (1919–1963) seems 
poised for a rediscovery. reading the first english-language 
translation of the text—published just last year as the 
appendix to Carlos Alberto Sánchez’s excellent scholarly 
treatment—one cannot help but wonder how the text 
remained untranslated for so long.1 Portilla’s work is full of 
novel and profound insights into topics that are both timeless 
and timely, including the nature of values, the meaning of 
freedom, and the proper use of passive resistance in the 
struggle for liberation.
the Phenomenology of Relajo (1966) centers upon Portilla’s 
critique of a well-known figure in mexican culture known as 
the relajiento. As a first approximation, we can think of the 
relajiento as a kind of “class clown,” a person who refuses 
to take anything seriously and never misses an opportunity 
to disrupt a group practice. He is an irrepressible jokester, 
beloved and feared for his ability to derail any meeting, 
performance, or party with his loud and obnoxious antics.
In Portilla’s view, mexican culture has always had great 
affection for the jokester. But Portilla worried that what was 
once a delightful cultural idiosyncrasy was becoming a 
dangerous cultural habit that threatened the entire society. 
more and more mexican men were becoming relajientos, 
he thought, and their refusal to take anything seriously 
was becoming truly nihilistic. Portilla worried that “the best 
representatives” of his generation were squandering their 
talents, and “in the midst of perpetual laughter . . . giving 
themselves up, really, to a slow process of self-destruction.”2
Sánchez’s treatment of the Phenomenology illuminates 
how creatively Portilla drew upon european philosophical 
influences to address this distinctively Latin American issue, 
and he is quite persuasive in his argument that this ostensibly 
provincial topic has great relevance for a wider audience. But 
while Sánchez is a capable champion of Portilla’s work, he 
concludes his book by offering some challenging thoughts 
to his readers, suggesting that Portilla may have been 
shortsighted in his unmitigated rejection of the relajiento. 
Sánchez proposes an alternative reading of the relajiento’s 
disruptive behavior that “reconceives it as an act of defiance 
before the colonial legacy . . . and against the axiological 
imperialism which that legacy instituted.”3 the point here, 
I take it, is that when we consider the immense legacy of 
colonial oppression facing our world, and consider how 
many of our cultural practices either collaborate with this 
oppression or seem powerless to challenge it effectively, 
the relajiento begins to look like a heroic freedom fighter, 
engaged in a kind of civil disobedience of the cultural 
sphere. Colonial oppression, Sánchez notes, protected itself 
by imposing “values of sobriety and order and progress,” 
and these values have been “kept alive today as a power 
that itself colonizes.”4 In this context, the behavior of the 
relajiento should be seen as “a creative response of the 
marginal in their marginality, whose resistance to value is, 
truly, an act of defiance.”5
Sánchez hopes that although the relajiento’s apathy and 
disruptions may undermine traditional cultural practices, 
this destruction might clear the way for new and better 
possibilities to emerge. Citing Jean-Francois Lyotard’s call 
in The Postmodern Condition “to increase displacement 
in the games, and even to disorient it, in such a way as to 
make an unexpected ‘move,’” Sánchez suggests that the 
relajiento’s actions might be “such a displacement and such 
an unexpected ‘move.’”6
In the meantime, Sánchez says, the relajiento’s “suspension 
of seriousness” may at least bring peace of mind. the 
relajiento may have found a way to avoid being filled with 
anxiety about the enormous problems confronting the post-
9/11 world and the dizzying complexity of today’s socio-
political landscape. As “an expression of that world and those 
anxieties,” he says, the relajiento “can survive the angst and 
terror through acts of suspension which might, possibly, as 
for the ancient skeptics, bring ataraxia, or tranquility.”7 this 
relajiento’s acts of suspension are thus a way to “postpone” 
serious commitment “for a future time”—a time when taking 
cultural practices seriously will not involve buying into an 
oppressive ideology, and may actually contribute to genuine 
liberation.8
Wrestling with Sánchez’s challenge has inspired me to dig 
deeper into Portilla’s work. While I find Sanchez’s re-reading 
of the relajiento compelling, looking at Portilla from the 
perspective of answering this challenge has unearthed 
aspects of Portilla’s rich text that I had not appreciated 
previously. As a result, I have come to believe that there 
are a few good points to be made in response to Sánchez’s 
criticism. I will try to outline those points here in the hopes of 
contributing to this important, ongoing dialogue about how 
best to understand the relajiento.
In this essay, then, I will defend Portilla’s criticism of the 
relajiento. I argue that Portilla was right to see the relajiento’s 
behavior as counterproductive in the fight for liberation from 
ideological oppression. Genuine freedom, in Portilla’s view 
and mine, requires seriousness and sincerity; it requires 
wholehearted participation in cultural practices that one 
finds truly valuable.
In trying to work out Portilla’s reasoning for this conclusion, 
I will suggest some new ways of understanding Portilla’s 
analysis of values and freedom. I suggest that Portilla sees 
values as neither self-standing nor subjectively posited; 
instead, he thinks that values “emerge” in a mood-like 
way. moreover, Portilla thinks that the values most crucial 
for achieving genuine freedom—the values that unify an 
individual’s experiences into a coherent and meaningful 
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whole, and thus make life worth living—are the kind of 
values that emerge only in the context of group practices. 
this is why the relajiento is so dangerous; by disrupting 
these practices and killing the mood that sustains them, the 
relajiento undermines not only his own freedom, but the 
freedom of others as well.
However, Portilla clearly thinks that those who are overly 
serious also undermine genuine freedom for themselves 
and others. With this in mind, I suggest that, for Portilla, the 
kind of “seriousness” that is required for freedom is one that 
is totally committed without being neurotic or uptight. one of 
Portilla’s most valuable contributions in this text, in my view, 
is his suggestion that black humor and Socratic irony can 
help us negotiate these competing demands of freedom. 
In other words, black humor and Socratic irony—which I will 
distinguish from the “postmodern” irony of the contemporary 
“hipster”—can enable us to remain detached enough from 
our values to avoid becoming uptight, dogmatic, and 
tyrannical, but yet not become too detached to participate 
wholeheartedly in the cultural practices that allow our values 
to be realized. Portilla’s ideal kind of seriousness is thus an 
attractive alternative to both the detachment of the relajiento 
and the hipster, as well as the uptight sobriety that expresses 
and entrenches a colonial legacy of oppression.
I argue that black humor and Socratic irony might also be 
extraordinarily potent tools for overcoming alienation from 
our communities and intervening effectively in cultural 
politics. read in this way, Portilla’s text becomes a sort of 
manual for cultural politics in the contemporary era. those 
committed to the struggle for liberation must learn to cope 
more effectively with the stubborn yet fragile societal 
moods that drive historical change. doing so is difficult and 
frustrating, today more so than ever, and so we may be 
tempted to lose our patience with the struggle altogether, 
as the relajiento does. I suggest, however, that Portilla’s 
nuanced understanding of cultural dynamics offers us hope 
that we can become more effective in transforming the 
values that guide our communities—and this hope should 
make us wary of the temptation to resign ourselves to the 
Stoic tranquility of postponed seriousness. 
let’S get SerioUS
At the most basic level, Portilla’s Phenenomenology is a 
perceptive analysis of the cultural phenomenon relajo. 
the term is difficult to translate, but we can think of relajo 
as a specific way that any group practice (such as a ballet 
performance or a birthday party) can break down—namely, 
by being intentionally undermined by “class clowns” and 
“spoilsports,” individuals who repeatedly disrupt the practice 
and distract the participants. Relajo occurs when this kind of 
disruptive behavior ruins the event or practice for anyone 
who was trying to “take it seriously.” In this sense, relajo 
might be summarized as a “suspension of seriousness.”9
Portilla offers the following example of relajo:
during a screening of the film version of 
Shakespeare’s Julius Ceasar, in the scene in 
which Cassius falls pierced by his own sword, the 
expectant silence in the movie theater was broken 
by a long moan that invincibly provoked laughter 
among the audience.10
Now, clever as it may be, a single well-timed joke is not 
sufficient to constitute the “suspension of seriousness” that 
is characteristic of relajo. In order to generate relajo, Portilla 
says, the disruption must be repeated.11
In some cultures, perhaps, such repetition would be unlikely. 
But in Portilla’s view, this kind of behavior had become 
something of a cultural habit in mexico, with people coming 
to anticipate such disruptions and play along with them. 
thus, it is entirely possible that, in this case, other people 
in the audience would have joined in the disruption, making 
jokes and mocking the film. If this had happened, then 
“between the mocking attitude of some and the indignation 
of others, disorder and confusion could have proliferated, 
putting an end to the aesthetic situation.”12 the film would 
be ruined for anyone trying to take it seriously—and this full-
scale breakdown of the group activity would be relajo.
many of us might participate in such a “suspension of 
seriousness” on occasion, but the relajiento goes so far as 
to adopt relajo as a way of life. Portilla criticizes the relajiento 
for this extremism. the relajiento has convinced himself that 
he is free—a lone wolf, free of commitment and not tied 
down to anything; indeed, the only one not duped by the 
hypocrites and fools who convince others to take things so 
seriously. But in fact, Portilla argues, the relajiento is not free 
at all.
Portilla argues that genuine freedom does not consist merely 
in being free from external constraints, but also in being free 
for life’s possibilities, or, in other words, being free to live 
for something that one finds worthwhile and takes seriously.
Freedom as pure negation . . . is not more than a 
mirage and a deception, since the “freedom from,” 
the negative freedom, is but the negative side of 
a “freedom to” . . . [Negative] freedom is but an 
aspect of positive freedom that is indeed a genuine 
liberation, an opening up of the path for effective 
action in the realization of values.13
to see Portilla’s point here, consider how oppressive it would 
be to find nothing worth doing: does this not perfectly 
describe the prison of clinical depression?14 In order to be 
genuinely free, then, one must find value in at least some 
of life’s possibilities. thus, Portilla concludes, the relajiento 
“illegitimately identifies rebelliousness with freedom.”15
But what does it mean to “find value” in something? Portilla 
argues that values are not self-standing; that is, values are 
not part of the “furniture of the universe,” waiting to be 
discovered. Instead, values exist only insofar as people hear 
and respond to the “call of value”—i.e., take those values 
“seriously.”  
All value, when grasped, appears surrounded by an 
aura of demands, endowed with a certain weight 
and with certain gravity that brings it from its pure 
ideality toward the world of reality. the value solicits 
its realization. the mere grasping of the value carries 
with it the fulfillment of that demand, of that call 
to its own realization in the world; and in order for 
this demand . . . to be realized, the subject, in turn, 
performs an act, a movement of loyalty [to the value] 
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that is a kind of “yes,” like an affirmative response. 
. . . this answer, this “yes” that corresponds by 
means of the subjective aspect of the grasping of 
the value . . . is an intimate movement of loyalty and 
commitment. this is seriousness.16
Portilla thus avoids two common but mistaken views of 
value. Not only are values not self-standing but, contrary to 
the view of some of his existentialist contemporaries, neither 
are values simply posited by the voluntaristic choice to see 
something as valuable. Instead, in Portilla’s view, values 
emerge into reality through the call-and-response interaction 
between a value and the person or group who recognizes 
that value.
Portilla distinguishes between the kind of values that can 
emerge for individuals in social isolation, and the kind of 
values that emerge only in the context of group practices. He 
says that the values that can emerge for individuals outside 
of group practices are values that do not depend upon our 
freedom. For example, the refreshing quality of cool water 
on a hot day is generated by a kind of biological reflex and 
does not depend on human freedom.17
But, Portilla argues, life’s most important values—the values 
that are truly essential for freedom—can only emerge in the 
context of a group practice, i.e., the coordinated, purposeful 
activity of a plurality of people. these are the values that 
emerge in the context of performances, educational activities, 
ceremonies, conversations, and parties, for example.18 As 
Portilla notes, they include what we might call “civic values,” 
as well as “religious and spiritual values,” but I would add 
that the category is really much more expansive than we 
might think. even the beauty of nature as it is appreciated 
on a solitary walk in the woods emerges in the context of a 
group practice—in this case, the practice of taking solitary 
walks in the woods to admire the beauty of nature.19
In Portilla’s view, the values that emerge through group 
practices are the values that one must take seriously if one 
is to achieve genuine freedom. the reason these values 
are so important, he says, is that they are the basis for an 
individual’s sense of temporality. that is, group practices—
birthday parties, funerals, elections, late-night conversations, 
and so on—are what bring a life together into a coherent 
whole, binding together what is otherwise an “indefinite sum 
of moments” to form a narrative with a meaningful sense of 
past, present, and future.20 No such meaningful narrative can 
be generated from the refreshing quality of cool water, nor 
from the mere collection of such experiences.
Genuine, positive freedom—freedom for or freedom to—
is essentially future-oriented, and an authentic future only 
exists in relation to a meaningful past and present. thus, by 
refusing to participate in the group practices that solidify an 
individual’s sense of temporality, Portilla says, the relajiento 
becomes “an individual without a future.”21 He is doomed 
to “a fragmentary temporality, a flicker of presents without 
direction and without form, of negations of the immediate 
past.”22 In this way, he undermines his own genuine, positive 
freedom. And as we will see, by ruining group practices for 
those trying to take them seriously, the relajiento undermines 
the freedom of others as well.
Killing the mood
We often take our values for granted. When our practices 
are working, and we unproblematically “find” joy at the fiesta 
and solemnity at the funeral, we typically do not notice 
how fragile these values are, and how they depend upon 
people’s participation in the roles and rules that govern group 
practices. this is precisely why analyzing relajo is so fruitful: 
As every phenomenologist knows, we can best understand 
the nature of a phenomenon by comparing its normal 
functioning to what happens to it during a “breakdown.”
I argue that analyzing the sort of breakdown described in 
Portilla’s example of the Shakespeare film, for example, 
reveals that life’s most important values emerge in a mood-
like way. that is, the successful functioning of all group 
practices depends upon the participants’ ability to evoke 
a mood, or an affectively charged atmosphere, which 
binds the group together and allows their shared values to 
emerge. the tragic quality of the film, for example, requires 
that members of the audience give themselves over to the 
tragic mood invoked by the film, just as the joyfulness of the 
fiesta depends upon partygoers giving themselves to the 
joyful mood of the party.
Although Portilla does not discuss the concept of mood, I 
suggest that it perfectly articulates what is at stake in the 
successful functioning of group practices, and what is lost 
when a practice devolves into relajo. two features of mood 
are particularly salient in this regard. First, moods are fragile. 
Setting the right mood is often difficult, but “killing the mood” 
is all too easy. Secondly, moods are atmospheric, in the sense 
that they are both social and contagious. they require the 
cooperation of everyone present, but yet they can easily fill a 
room and grip everyone in it. moods are also atmospheric in 
the sense of being intangible and even invisible. We typically 
recognize and respond to moods intuitively, below the level 
of explicit conscious awareness.
Keeping these features of mood in mind can help us make 
sense of one of Portilla’s particularly controversial, but 
important, claims. When discussing a ballet, Portilla argues 
that the gracefulness of the dancer depends not only on the 
dancer’s skill and technique, but on the participation of the 
audience as well.
Gracefulness, undoubtedly, rests on the dance 
technique—learned laboriously by the performer—
but also on recognition by the spectator. In a certain 
sense, it is a collective endeavor directed from 
within by a tacit agreement between performer and 
audience. It emerges, precarious and vulnerable, like 
a burgeoning that lays root in the field of harmony 
among dancers, musicians, and spectators, and 
it survives as something definitive, prefect, and 
stimulating in the memory of all these groups. this 
gracefulness cannot attain the stability and solidity 
of the “thing-value.” Its evanescent reality has 
required the support of multiple generosities, and 
it rests on this support. Just as the value pursued 
in the self-constitution of existence, the value never 
comes to attain definitive being; but in contrast to 
it, [this gracefulness] can almost be touched in a 
perception that partakes in the evidence of things 
and of the transparency of the purely meaningful, 
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of the etherealness of consciousness and of 
freedom.23
moods are like this. they can be palpable, plainly evident, 
gripping everyone present; but they nonetheless remain 
ethereal and vulnerable to sudden reversals. As an 
essentially social phenomenon, anyone present potentially 
has the power to alter the mood of the group and radically 
disrupt the entire practice. Imagine, for instance, that just 
as the mood of the ballet is beginning to take hold, and 
the gracefulness of the dancer is beginning to mesmerize 
the audience, someone begins to make noises mimicking 
flatulence every time the dancer leaps into the air. Suddenly, 
the gracefulness of the dancer is transformed into something 
quite different!24
this is why the relajiento’s extremism, his unrelenting refusal 
to take anything seriously, constitutes a profound threat to 
the freedom of everyone he comes in contact with.
Relajo kills action in its crib. It negates the only thing that gives 
an act sense; it impedes the light of value from illuminating 
those ends and means through which its realization could 
be conducted. It is a paradoxical inactive action which makes 
the call of value sterile.25
Although filmmakers and dancers may need courage to face 
harsh critics, they are often inspired by this challenge. Yet 
who could feel called to “effective action in the realization 
of values” when the mood of the group is dominated by the 
mockery of the relajiento? thus, by rendering “the call of 
value sterile,” the relajiento diminishes others’ freedom for 
life’s possibilities.
While the relajiento’s extremism is to be avoided, his bold 
action may help us to overcome an unfortunate fetishism 
that plagues both the art world and the world of politics and 
cultural activism. In art, we tend to fetishize the art object, 
not realizing that its beauty or power depends to a significant 
degree on the response of the audience, and that audience 
members have a great deal of latitude to determine for 
themselves how they will approach and appreciate any 
piece of art. Similarly, in both politics and culture, we tend 
to fetishize the figurehead of a practice, the individual who 
functions as the “repository” of the shared value of the 
group.26 the relajiento has much to teach us about how 
those of us who are not in positions of power or authority 
can radically alter the mood of a group—and thereby help 
to shape the values of a community. We will return to this 
theme in the concluding section.
the dangerS of being Uptight
Although Portilla comes down hard on the relajiento, his 
sharpest criticisms are directed toward another cultural figure 
in mexico, the apretado. the apretado is an uptight snob, 
a person who is self-important and devoid of playfulness, 
strictly adhering to elitist or “establishment” norms of 
success.27 the apretado, Portilla says, takes himself and his 
projects far too seriously. Like the relajiento, the apretado is 
unable to achieve freedom for himself, and he becomes a 
profound danger to the freedom of others as well.
thus, in Portilla’s view, seriousness is not enough for freedom. 
In order to be truly free, we must also retain and utilize the 
capacity to be reflectively detached from our values. He 
suggests that the capacity for language endows all humans 
with some ability to gain such reflective distance.
[Language can] situate me in accordance to that 
ideal distance to myself which is freedom, or, at 
least, which is one of the conditions of freedom. 
It allows me to take different positions relative to 
myself and it delivers me to my own decision; it 
allows me to choose, with a clean conscience, a 
mode of conduct not necessarily reducible to the 
situation in which I find myself. the word can tear 
me from the magma of the situation allowing me 
to act against the objective stream of forces that 
emanate from it: against the forces of psychological 
habit, tradition, class interest, etc.28
By putting the values I experience into language, Portilla 
suggests, I project them from my interiority onto the external, 
social plane. this allows me to step back and contemplate my 
values more dispassionately and even to look at them from 
different angles. the capacity for reflective distance, then, is 
a kind of negative freedom that is a crucial prerequisite for 
genuine, positive freedom.
the capacity to gain reflective distance from these values 
gives us some “room to maneuver” in relation to them. 
Without this minimal reflective distance from what we 
experience as valuable, Portilla suggests, our actions would 
look more like mere reflexes. this is precisely the situation 
of the apretado, who refuses to utilize his innate capacity to 
gain reflective distance and insists upon seeing his values 
as a settled fact of the matter. taking up this stubborn and 
dogmatic attitude, the apretado cannot “take different 
positions relative to [himself],” and so he cannot “laugh at 
[himself].”29 thus, the apretado is not free.
Building upon Portilla’s analysis, I argue that the apretado’s 
uptight nature will make him particularly incapable of 
working successfully with the mood-like nature of value. His 
heavy-handed approach is unsuited for the task of coaxing 
value into existence. Indeed, the apretado sees no need 
to cooperate with others in the delicate call-and-response 
interaction that allows value to emerge, largely because 
he sees himself as an embodiment of values that are self-
standing and objectively valid. 
to “apretado” individuals, “being” and “value” are 
carefully identified with each other at that privileged 
point in the world which is their own person. . . . 
“Apretado” individuals are compact masses of 
value; they live themselves on the inside like a 
dense volume of value-filled “being,” like a bundle 
of valuable “properties,” conceived according to 
the model of the properties of a thing. . . . Perhaps 
they may not yet be more than an honest official, 
very intelligent, very effective, and full of qualities. 
But “apretado” individuals have an infinite advantage 
over all other individuals: they are all these things. . . . 
When an “apretado” goes for a walk, an official goes 
for a walk; when an “apretado” eats, an official eats. 
An intelligent and efficient person sleeps; a person 
with good taste walks along the street; a person of 
talent calmly enjoys breakfast. (191f)
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thus, the apretado is guilty of the kind of “bad faith” that 
Jean-Paul Sartre famously attributes to the café waiter who 
pretends that he is a waiter in the same way that a table 
is a table.30 In Portilla’s view, however, values never exist 
with such stability. thus, no matter how much I try to be a 
punctual person, rushing every morning to make it to the 
office on time, I will always discover that “value has escaped 
me once again. I have not succeeded in incorporating value 
into myself, in constituting my being definitely, nor will I ever 
achieve this.”31
Although he tries to deny the mood-like nature of value, 
the apretado is constantly confronted with the fact that the 
value he seeks can only emerge when it is recognized by 
others. Like the gracefulness of the dancer, the apretado’s 
talent, calmness, and punctuality only emerge into being 
with the collaboration of an audience, just as his office 
and his important projects could not function without the 
cooperation of others who recognize their importance. But 
since he insists that he is a solitary embodiment of self-
standing value, the apretado has no interest in “constituting 
a ‘we’” with others in order to cooperatively realize the 
values he seeks.32 thus, he can only feel threatened by 
his inescapable dependence upon other people, as if this 
dependence makes him a “slave of others.”33 
resentful of the need to cooperate with others, Portilla 
argues, people who are overly serious tend to “demand 
recognition of themselves as value-filled beings” and “want 
others to submit to them.”34 Simone de Beauvoir makes a 
similar point about the tyrannical tendencies of the “serious 
man.”
By virtue of the fact that he refuses to recognize 
that he is freely establishing the value of the end 
he sets up, the serious man makes himself the slave 
of that end. . . . [the] serious man puts nothing 
into question. For the military man, the army is 
useful; for the colonial administrator, the highway; 
for the serious revolutionary, the revolution—
army, highway, revolution, productions becoming 
inhuman idols to which one will not hesitate to 
sacrifice man himself. therefore, the serious man 
is dangerous. It is natural that he makes himself a 
tyrant.35
By becoming tyrannical, the apretado is likely to squash the 
emergence of value within any group practice. After all, no 
one is able to genuinely and spontaneously feel the “call of 
value” when the demands of a tyrant are constantly killing 
the mood. In this way, the apretado undermines both his 
own freedom and that of others as well. He is indeed “the 
living denial of freedom.”36
As we have seen, Portilla’s analysis of the apretado parallels 
similar analyses in the work of Sartre and de Beauvoir. 
Nevertheless, Portilla makes an important contribution: 
although Sartre and de Beauvoir recognize the dangerousness 
of the “serious man,” they themselves are quite grave in their 
treatment of freedom. Indeed, one is unable to find much of 
a sense of humor or irony in any of their writings. Although 
these europeans are admirably committed to the cause of 
liberation, they do not seem to recognize just how powerful 
humor and Socratic irony can be.
hUmor and irony in CUltUral politiCS
Cultural politics is largely about shaping the mood of a 
community. of course, moods are hard to predict or control, 
and so it is tempting to dismiss their importance, or even 
detach completely from the cultural practices that build 
them, as the relajiento does. But this would be a mistake. 
moods, while fragile, are also astoundingly powerful. 
When the mood for change grips a society, regimes that 
once appeared invulnerable will crumble with astonishing 
swiftness. on the other hand, even the most capable and 
well-intentioned activists will become utterly irrelevant if 
they alienate themselves from the moods that are ascendant 
in their societies.
those who recognize the power of mood may be tempted to 
become too forceful in attempting to shape the mood of a 
community. this danger is especially pressing for those who 
feel that the cultural habits and institutions around them are 
in need of radical transformation. But more often than not, 
forcefulness will kill a mood. An ugly eruption of violence 
caused by a momentary lack of restraint, for example, can 
quickly destroy a society’s appetite for reform. those who 
are overly serious or uptight in their commitment to the cause 
of liberation are unlikely to have the finesse and patience 
required to cope flexibly and effectively with the vicissitudes 
of cultural moods.
one thing that makes Portilla’s work so exciting is that 
he offers a plausible account of how to participate 
wholeheartedly in cultural practices without becoming overly 
serious. Indeed, negotiating these competing demands 
of freedom—remaining totally committed to one’s values 
while also retaining the capacity to reflectively detach and 
even laugh at oneself—is the essence of genuine liberation. 
to this end, Portilla offers two potent tools to the cultural 
activist: humor and Socratic irony. With these tools, one can 
both negotiate the competing demands of freedom, and 
contribute effectively to the transformation of the mood and 
values of a community.
Humor, Portilla says, has the unique power to “[free] us from 
a negative value, from an adversity.”37 Portilla is particularly 
fond of black humor in this regard. Black humor begins with 
an acknowledgment of adversity and suffering. thus, it does 
not alienate those who are suffering with a flippant denial 
of “the painful, somber, or sinister aspects of existence.”38 
But in a sudden reversal, black humor reveals a way to laugh 
about these circumstances, and thereby to transcend them. 
thus [humor] shows how human beings are 
always beyond themselves and their circumstance, 
how humans can find themselves in the most 
adverse situations and face up to them as if they 
were external, alien acts that cannot get to them 
completely. . . . “I am me and my circumstance,” 
said ortega y Gasset. to the humorist, I am rather 
me before my circumstance.39 
In this way, black humor can help people cope with their 
suffering and regain control over their circumstances.
It would be profoundly imprudent to dismiss the serious 
power of humor. Anyone who has suffered knows that 
physical and emotion pain are among the most powerful 
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forces in setting the mood of a person or a community. Pain 
can radically diminish the field of live possibilities and even 
deform the long-term dispositions of individuals and groups. 
When we are suffering, black humor is one of the only ways 
to avoid becoming either overly detached or overly serious. 
It offers a way to remain totally committed to one’s values 
while nurturing one’s freedom of thought and spirit.
In a similar vein, Portilla also recommends the tool of 
Socratic irony for both preserving one’s own freedom and 
effectively intervening in the mood of one’s society. We must 
take special care to understand Portilla’s analysis of irony, 
however, because it is quite different from both relajo and 
the form of irony we are perhaps most familiar with, the 
“postmodern” irony of the contemporary “hipster.”
In his essay, “E Unibus Pluram: television and U.S. Fiction,” 
david Foster Wallace skewers the irony that characterizes the 
contemporary era in popular culture.40 Wallace argues that 
irony was an appropriate and effective response to Ward 
Cleaver, the prototypical fifties father, and to the hypocrisy 
of the advertisers and cultural elites of that era. But today, 
cultural elites have abandoned that old-fashioned sincerity 
and have co-opted the irony of their critics. In this new age 
of postmodern irony or “meta-irony,” advertisers no longer 
even pretend that their products are Good and right, and 
cultural elites are quick to make fun of themselves. thus, 
propaganda today comes with a wink to acknowledge that 
the audience is “in the know” and cannot be duped.
In these circumstances, Wallace says, irony is no longer 
liberating. Instead, irony only enables people to continue 
betraying their loftiest ideals, reassuring themselves that no 
one is silly enough to think that buying a Pepsi signifies that 
they actually endorse Pepsi or want to be part of the “Pepsi 
Generation.” In this way, irony is the last refuge of the hipster, 
who is committed to expressing himself “authentically” and 
rejecting all manner of conformism—even the “conformism” 
of the sincere, non-conformist “hippie” of his parent’s 
generation.41 By making people overly detached from their 
values and overly suspicious of any sincere participation in 
communal practices, irony today is nothing but “the song of 
the prisoner who has come to love his cage.”42
I admit that the relajiento may feel like a welcome alternative 
in this context. After all, like the ironic hipster, the relajiento 
is also detached from communal values, but the relajiento’s 
bold and aggressive style actually succeeds in disrupting the 
smooth functioning of cultural practices where the hipster’s 
irony only entrenches them. In this way, relajo can be seen 
as a kind of “active nihilism” that says, with Nietzsche, “that 
which is falling, let us push it down faster!” And Sánchez is 
surely right that, theoretically, the relajiento’s disruptions 
could possibly clear the way for unexpected, anomalous 
possibilities to emerge.
the problem, however, is that the relajiento does not use his 
impressive ability to disrupt cultural practices in any strategic 
way. He does not attempt to undermine specific values at 
particular times. the relajiento is an extremist, and Portilla is 
right to argue that his refusal to be sincere and serious about 
anything will make him ineffective in establishing any mood 
other than nihilism. thus, even if new values do emerge from 
the ruins of old practices, these values will only be sustained 
by the fragile call-and-response interaction that sustains all 
values, and then the relajiento will be as dangerous to these 
new values as he was to the old.
Fortunately, we need not choose among being an apretado, 
a relajiento, or a hipster. Portilla offers a more promising 
alternative: Socratic irony. As Jonathan Lear explains, Socratic 
irony is a way of responding productively when we find 
ourselves to be representatives of social practices that fall 
short of their own ideals.43 the strategy is to maintain sincere 
fidelity to these ideals, even while provoking uncertainty 
about what the ideals actually require of those who hold 
them.
Socrates utilized this strategy to great effect. As Portilla notes, 
Socrates’s irony was capable of suddenly undermining the 
authority of his interlocutors.
When Socrates tells euthyphro, “You, admirable 
euthyphro, are the only one of us who knows what 
piety is,” all of us see that euthyphro knows nothing 
about piety. What has happened here? . . . the 
meaning of the proposition “You know what piety is” 
remains the same, but its sense has totally changed. 
. . . Irony has suddenly transformed euthyphro the 
wise into euthyphro the ignorant.44
Lear notes that Kierkegaard utilizes this same strategy, 
asking, in effect, in all of Christendom, is there a Christian? 
this question, Lear says, “asks whether amongst all who 
understand themselves as Christian there is anyone who is 
living up to the requirements of Christian life.”45 the question 
“injects a certain form of not-knowing into polis life,” an 
uncertainty not only about what the ideal requires, but even 
about what it means to reflect critically on that ideal. this 
profound kind of not-knowing undermines the authority of 
those who claim to know what is required by the ideals of 
Christianity and portray themselves as the embodiment of 
devotion to those ideals.46
Cultural authorities are typically accustomed to coping with 
direct confrontations with people who reject their values, 
and these days they have also become adept at dealing with 
post-ironic apathy. But cultural authorities are vulnerable 
to Socratic irony precisely because it embraces traditional 
values with extraordinary seriousness. Indeed, this sincerity 
can itself be quite disruptive in the post-ironic age. In this 
way, Socratic irony can be thought of as a kind of cultural 
jujitsu that uses its opponent’s strength against him. It 
yields unconditionally to established values, but in a sudden 
reversal, it undermines the traditional manner in which those 
values are understood and reflected upon.
one example of Socratic irony, I suggest, might be found 
in José martí’s famous essay, “our America.” In this essay, 
martí embraces traditional Latin American machismo, even 
while reshaping its significance. In a subtle but poignant 
transformation of the ideal of masculinity, martí declares 
that “real men” are those who embrace the value of staying 
home to nurture sick family members.
those without faith in their country are seven-
month weaklings. . . . their puny arms—arms with 
bracelets and hands with painted nails, arms of Paris 
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or madrid . . . let them go to the Prado, to swan 
around, or to tortoni’s in high hats. . . . those born 
in America who are ashamed of their mother who 
reared them because she wears an Indian apron; 
and those scoundrels who disown their sick mother, 
abandoning her on her sickbed! then who is a real 
man? . . . these delicate creatures . . . are unwilling 
to do men’s work!47
the power of Socratic irony is its capacity to produce this 
kind of transformation. Its success depends on its ability to 
hew closely to traditional conceptions of an ideal even while 
radically changing the significance of traditional practices. In 
this way, it is akin to a musician changing the key of a familiar 
melody, or a writer changing the mood of a familiar narrative.
For Kierkegaard, as for Lear, Socratic irony is something that 
provokes radical uncertainty in individuals, not groups.48 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this essay to examine 
what precisely would be required to experience Socratic irony 
in public and thereby provoke radical uncertainty in an entire 
community. I will simply suggest that something like this is 
precisely what is driving many of today’s most promising 
political movements around the world. We can recognize 
this Socratic irony in movements that present themselves 
as patriotic or “conservative” even while opposing their 
governments or traditional cultural practices, and in forms of 
activism that are truly innovative but manage to draw upon 
recognized aspects of their cultural heritage.
With this strategy even the most radical cultural reformers 
might be able to take seriously their society’s mainstream 
values—including democracy, national security, religion, 
capitalism, and machismo—while also working to provoke 
radical uncertainty about what is required by these values 
and how we can manage to reflect critically upon them. After 
all, as Lear points out and martí’s essay demonstrates, all 
values are complex, evolving, and eternally open to revision. 
For this reason, our cultural heritage is almost always complex 
enough to find the seeds for novel and inspiring modes of 
thought and action.49
Unlike the postmodern irony of the hipster, Socratic irony 
does not deny its wholehearted acceptance of these 
shared values. Socratic irony does not wink. As Portilla puts 
it, Socratic irony “is founded on a supreme seriousness, 
since seriousness is nothing other than vocation for and 
unconditional devotion to a value.”50 And precisely because 
it is it so serious, Socratic irony offers a way to overcome 
one’s alienation from society. In contrast to relajo, Portilla 
says, Socratic irony is “capable of founding a community . 
. . of opening up a perspective for communication of some 
human beings with others in a constructive task.”51
thus, Socratic irony might not only make us more effective in 
cultural politics, it might also allow us to experience the kind 
of seriousness that is required for genuine freedom. that is, 
it might enable us to balance the opposing requirements 
of freedom, taking our values seriously without losing touch 
with the reflective detachment that allows us to see our 
values from different perspectives.
In conclusion, I hope to have outlined some good reasons 
to think that Portilla was wise to reject relajo as a way of life. 
By utilizing black humor and Socratic irony, it is possible to 
work effectively from within established cultural forms in 
order to bring about radical change. Indeed, doing so is of 
the utmost importance, for as Portilla shows, an individual’s 
freedom is inescapably wrapped up with the liberation of his 
society. once we recognize that values emerge in a mood-
like way, and that the values that are most crucial to genuine 
freedom and make life worth living can only emerge in the 
context of group practices, we will see the need to resist the 
temptation to detach from these practices—and the urgency 
of taking them seriously.
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Sam hoUSton State UniverSity
José Carlos mariátegui is among the best known marxist 
philosophers of Latin America. Arguing on behalf of 
Indigenous rights and influencing the likes of ernesto Che 
Guevara, mariátegui is not only respected by Latin Americans 
as a philosopher but also admired for his uncompromising 
courage. this article aims to provide readers with the 
historical and intellectual context from which mariátegui 
developed his thoughts regarding a revolutionary myth. to 
this end, we begin with mariátegui’s historical context; we 
then consider the influence that manuel González Prada, 
Georges Sorel, and Antonio Gramsci had on mariátegui’s 
thought. We also examine mariátegui’s suggestions and his 
assessment of the Peruvian situation.1
hiStoriCal Context
mariátegui formulated his ideas regarding a revolutionary 
myth between 1920 and 1930, about a century after Perú 
became independent from Spain in 1824. these hundred 
or so years allowed mariátegui the historical perspective to 
see the various stages that Perú had undergone, and where 
his country was at that time. He was well aware of Peruvian 
history, the slavery of the Indigenous people during the 
Spanish colonization, and the promises of freedom for all 
peoples that were made during the war of independence. 
during the nearly four centuries that Perú was a Spanish 
colony, Spain was primarily interested in mining silver and 
gold from Perú. Aside from institutionalized slavery, the 
colonizers were not interested in developing other internal 
structures, and the interests of the Indigenous people were 
simply not a factor when the Peruvian war of independence 
took place. mariátegui explains that there were two main 
reasons for this war.2 First, the French revolution and the 
U.S. Constitution evoked a sense of freedom in the Latin 
American bourgeoisie, and these events caused them to 
want their independence from Spain. the second reason for 
the war of independence was the economic interests of the 
Latin American bourgeoisie who wished to engage england, 
europe, and North America. As long as the Latin American 
bourgeoisie were subject to Spanish rule, they were not free 
to engage other countries economically. thus, the Peruvian 
war of independence was fought to gain freedom for the 
Peruvian people; however, Indigenous people did not figure 
into its goals. It was ultimately the economic interests of the 
creole class that propelled the various wars of independence 
in the Americas.
once Perú became independent from Spain, the local 
bourgeoisie entered into trade agreements with england 
and other european countries as well as North America. 
these economic agreements enabled Perú to borrow 
money from england in exchange for guano. england and 
the United States invested in the development of railways in 
Perú, in machinery to further mine gold and silver, and in the 
industrialization of the cities on the coast.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, mariátegui 
observed three types of economies in Perú: communism, 
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feudalism, and capitalism. In the Peruvian context, 
communism was the economic system that characterized 
the Indigenous communities where there was no private 
property to exploit or invest. Indigenous communism was 
based on the reciprocity of services. A feudal system existed 
alongside the Indigenous communism. When Perú became 
independent from Spain, the land that had been previously 
assigned to the Peruvian criollos in the form of encomiendas 
became the property of the Peruvian bourgeoisie who took 
control over the land along with the Indigenous people who 
lived there. mariátegui writes that, during the time of the 
new republic, “the elements and characteristics of a feudal 
society were mixed with the elements of a slave-holding 
society.”3 the Peruvian bourgeoisie obtained their freedom 
from Spain and now had absolute power to continue 
exploiting the Indigenous population. Instead of gaining 
their freedom, conditions for the Indigenous people during 
the new republic worsened.
the Spanish viceroyalty was actually less harsh on Indigenous 
people than the republic. true, the Spanish viceroyalty was 
responsible for the enslavement of the Indians. However, 
during the Spanish inquisition, Bartolome de las Casas 
intensely defended the Indians against the brutal methods 
of the colonizers; there was no such figure to argue on 
behalf of Indigenous people during the time of the republic. 
the Spanish viceroyalty was a medieval and foreign regime 
while the republic was a Peruvian and liberal institution. 
In this sense, the republic had economic and political 
obligations towards Indigenous people that the Spanish 
viceroyalty did not have. Contrary to this duty, the republic 
further impoverished Indigenous people, aggravated their 
depression and intensified their misery.4
during the republic, the feudal lord had absolute power over 
the land and the people who lived there. mariátegui explains 
how the peasants contributed the seeds, their labor, and 
the materials necessary for farming. After the harvest, the 
peasants and the feudal lord divided the products, “and 
this, with the feudal lord having done nothing more than to 
allow the use of his land without even fertilizing it.”5 Besides 
working for a feudal lord, Indigenous people also worked in 
the mines. 
the mining industry is almost entirely in the hands 
of two major U.S. companies. Wages are paid in 
the mines, but the pay is negligible, the defense 
of the worker’s life is almost zero, the workers’ 
compensation law is circumvented. the system 
of enganche falsely enslaves the workers and 
places the Indians at the mercy of these capitalist 
enterprises. the feudal land condemns the Indians 
to so much misery that the Indians prefer the fate 
the mines have to offer.6
Needless to say, mariátegui was deeply affected by his 
historical circumstance. this resulted in his exile from Perú in 
1920 due to his criticism of Augusto B. Leguía’s government 
(1908–1912, 1919–1930). In europe, mariátegui became 
acquainted with the thought of Georges Sorel and Antonio 
Gramsci, both of whom influenced mariátegui decisively. 
When mariátegui returned from europe in 1923 he wrote his 
Siete ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana, his 
most incisive critique of the Peruvian situation. the following 
section provides the intellectual context from which 
mariátegui developed his revolutionary myth.
gonzález prada, gramSCi, and Sorel
mariátegui was influenced by several of manuel González 
Prada’s (1848–1918) ideas. Among these are the distinction 
that González Prada makes between the Indigenous reality 
vis-á-vis the other social classes of Perú and what González 
Prada’s calls, “indigenism.”
González Prada aimed to promote Peruvian nationalism with 
his “discurso en el Politeama” (1888). Here, he exposed the 
schism of the Peruvian republic among the creole, mestizo, 
and Indigenous people. the collective consciousness of 
the Peruvian bourgeoisie acknowledged the existence of 
Indigenous people as people only after Perú was defeated 
by Chile in the Pacific War (1879–1883). Peruvians expected 
to win the war against Chile because Perú had been the 
center of the Spanish viceroyalty and Peruvians believed 
themselves to be more powerful than Chile; nevertheless, 
Perú lost this war.
González Prada was critical of his own social class and 
suggested that lack of nationalism was the likely cause 
for their defeat. mariátegui wrote that González Prada 
embodied “the first moment of lucid consciousness of 
Perú.”7 González Prada represented the moment when the 
Peruvian bourgeoisie realized for the very first time that 
Indigenous people were part of Perú. González Prada writes, 
“If we made a serf out of the Indian, then what country is he 
supposed to defend? Just like the medieval serf, the Indian 
will only defend the interests of his feudal lord.”8
In his 1904 essay “Nuestros Indios,” González Prada 
associates Peruvian nationalism with indigenism. He points 
out the feudal conditions that existed in Perú at the time:
It is nowhere written but everywhere observed 
that when it comes to the Indian he has no rights 
but obligations. When it comes to him, a personal 
complaint is taken as a sign of insubordination, as 
a collective outbreak of revolt. the Spanish royalists 
killed him when he tried to shake off the yoke of 
his conquerors. We the republicans will exterminate 
him when he grieves of his onerous work. our form 
of government is essentially a big lie because a 
state where two or three million people live set 
apart from the law does not deserve to be called a 
democratic republic.9
González Prada speculated that given the circumstances, 
“either the ruling class ceded some of its power to Indigenous 
people, or Indigenous people would muster the courage to 
punish their oppressors.”10 mariátegui agreed, “the main 
question regarding the Indian, more than pedagogical, 
is economic, it is social.”11 For mariátegui, the Indigenous 
condition would only be ameliorated by the return of land 
and the empowerment of people.12
Like Antonio Gramsci, mariátegui was also interested in 
studying cultural issues. Gramsci believed that the seizing 
of political power by the proletariat would not be sufficient 
to manifest a revolutionary movement. Besides the seizing 
of political power, a counterhegemonic structure must be 
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developed in order to replace the existing structure. Gramsci 
believed that the role of the socialist party was to motivate 
awareness so that politically passive subjects would become 
politically active agents.13
Given Gramsci’s influence upon mariátegui’s thought, 
mariátegui argued that a change in the economic structure 
would not be sufficient to change the sociopolitical conditions 
of the Indigenous people in Perú. In his essay “el Proceso 
de la Instrucción Pública,” mariátegui cites the declaration 
made by the Argentine newspaper La Vanguardia in 1925. 
there are two important ideas to note here. the first idea is 
what mariátegui thought about education, and the second, 
Gramsci’s influence on mariátegui regarding hegemony.
the educational problem is but one phase of 
the social problem, hence it cannot be solved 
in isolation. the culture of any society is the 
ideological expression of the interests of the ruling 
class. the culture of our current society is therefore 
the ideological expression of the capitalist class 
interests.14
Given that the problem was the hegemony of the capitalist 
class, and the oppression was not merely economic, but 
also cultural, aesthetic, and educational, mariátegui believed 
that besides changing the economic structure, it was also 
necessary that the proletariat and Indigenous people be 
made aware of their sociopolitical situation. 
In addition to Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony, 
mariátegui also believed it would be best to stop thinking 
of the socialist revolution as being historically determined. 
rather than expecting the revolution to take place on its 
own, the socialist revolution requires a deliberate activism to 
bring about the revolution. this is crucial because mariátegui 
goes on to combine Gramsci’s idea of deliberate activism 
with Georges Sorel’s notion of myth to arrive at his own 
conclusions.
In Reflections on Violence (1906), Georges Sorel argues 
for the rejection of reform movements. Instead, he 
recommends a revolutionary myth that would bring about a 
general strike, which would in turn encourage and mobilize 
the proletariat class to enter the class war and undermine 
capitalism.15 Unlike Gramsci, Sorel was not interested in 
building a coherent and consistent ideological structure that 
would ensure that desired change would endure. According 
to Sorel, what was important was the political mobilization 
of the working class.16 Sorel admired the passionate blind 
faith that characterizes some religious followers, and he 
advocated for the proletariat to develop a similar kind of 
faith that the socialist revolution is not only possible but also 
desirable, imminent, and necessary. Sorel writes:
those who live in the world of myths are free from 
any kind of refutation and cannot be discouraged. 
It is therefore through myths that we should 
understand the activity, feelings and ideas of the 
public as they prepare to enter a decisive fight.17
For Sorel, it was of utmost importance for the proletariat 
to develop absolute trust in the success of the revolution; 
even if this meant the revolutionary leaders had to deceive 
the proletariat, “even assuming that revolutionaries must be 
entirely deceived in the project to begin with the general 
strike.”18 Like Sorel, mariátegui also believed it would be 
necessary for the proletariat to be spiritually prepared in 
order to bring about a successful revolution. 
mariátegUi’S aSSeSSment of the perUvian 
SitUation
In 1924, the Communist International believed the best way 
to establish socialism in Latin America would be to classify 
the continent by language and race.19 Although mariátegui 
wished for Perú to stop being a neo-colony of Western 
imperialism and also believed the best way to achieve this 
goal would be through socialism, mariátegui disagreed 
with the International’s approach. He was convinced the 
Indigenous problem was not one of language or race, but 
rather the feudal condition of land distribution. He wished to 
see Perú end its economic dependence on foreign capital 
as well as the integration of Indigenous people into the 
Peruvian national culture.
mariátegui argued that the best alternative to feudalism in 
Perú would be the native Peruvian community structure of 
the ayllu. An ayllu is an Indigenous community where private 
property does not exist; thus, members of the ayllu cannot 
invest in, nor exploit property for economic gain. the ayllu’s 
economy is characterized by the reciprocity of services the 
members provide for each other. mariátegui believed the 
ayllu would solve Perú’s feudalism problem because the 
ayllu was a native communal structure.20 However, in 1929, 
during the First Communist Latin American Conference that 
took place in Buenos Aires, the International decided to 
censor mariátegui’s ideas for being unorthodox.21
Just the year before the International censored mariátegui, 
he disagreed publicly with Victor raul Haya de la torre, the 
founder and leader of APrA (Alianza Popular revolucionaria 
Americana). mariátegui struck out on his own and established 
the Socialist party of Perú. this is important because, having 
been influenced by Sorel, mariátegui did not believe 
that a democratic consensus was necessary to establish 
a socialist system in Perú. Instead, like Sorel, mariátegui 
focused on how to bring about a revolution and advocated 
a revolutionary vanguard consisting of the proletariat and 
Indigenous people.22
mariátegui also refused to consider education as a means 
of improving the sociopolitical and economic situation of 
Indigenous people because the type of education they 
received at that time was only a means of perpetuating the 
status quo. For mariátegui, the right of Indigenous people to 
own their own land was more fundamental than their right 
to an education. As long as Indigenous people continued 
living in a feudal system, their education would only serve 
to maintain the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. According to 
mariátegui’s Gramscian interpretation, education was simply 
indoctrination to the belief that Indigenous people were 
naturally inferior to the bourgeoisie. education only served 
to further bind Indigenous people to the subservient place 
they had been assigned in the feudal system.
the Indigenous problem of illiteracy is in reality a 
much larger problem that goes beyond being a 
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simple pedagogical issue. everyday we can see 
how instruction is not the same as education. the 
elementary schooling the Indian receives does 
not uplift him morally or socially. the first concrete 
step towards a redemptive improvement must be 
abolishing their subservience.23
Given this type of education, mariátegui was doubtful that 
Indigenous people would acquire the necessary skills to 
govern themselves, and no democratic or liberal institution 
would be able to thrive as long as Perú remained a feudal 
state.
moreover, communist movements have been generally 
characterized by their rejection of religious beliefs. 
mariátegui did not agree with this communist approach 
either. A biographical anecdote about mariátegui relates 
how his mother, maria Amalia La Chira, had lost her first 
three children shortly after giving birth to them, and she had 
found refuge from her suffering in the Catholic religion. Her 
commitment to religious faith was so strong that in order to 
protect her children, she left her husband Francisco Javier 
mariátegui when she learned that he was the son of an 
atheist. maria Amalia shared her deep religious commitment 
with her children, and although mariátegui was critical of 
the catastrophic consequences of the Spanish colonization 
and genocide, still mariátegui writes: “As far as religion is 
concerned, the Spanish colonization did not commit any 
excesses.”24 mariátegui believed that religion is an essential 
part of being human, and it was not necessary to reject 
religion to bring about social change. 
mariátegui suggested we expand our definition of religion 
because, he argued, a revolution is a type of religious 
endeavor, and communism is essentially religious.25 He 
believed human beings are spiritual beings who are 
compelled into action by the spiritual and ethical dimensions 
of myths. He writes: “Secular morality . . . does not satisfy the 
need for absolutes that exists as the basis of every human 
question.”26 He believed that without a myth or ideals for us 
to believe in, and strive towards, human existence would 
have no historical significance.
a myth aS SolUtion
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
philosophers were increasingly captivated by positivism in 
science and philosophy. Positivism became such a strong 
philosophical current that it affected the policies of several 
Latin American countries. Porfirio díaz’s dictatorship in méxico 
(1876–1911), for instance, was justified by los cientificos.27 
For example, the justification as to why the class in power 
should remain in power was an argument along these lines: 
“Who should we trust to make important decisions, such as 
how to govern? Should the average uneducated person, or 
those who have experience with these issues, decide? It 
makes sense for those with the most relevant experience 
to make the decisions.” In this way, power remained in the 
hands of the upper educated class, while the lower classes 
had no choice but to bend to the decisions of the scientists.
But not all philosophers of this time were captivated by 
positivism. Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, pointed out that 
positivism oftentimes led to nihilism.28 mariátegui was not 
impressed by positivism either, and instead saw religion as 
a solution to the nihilist attitudes of this time. He believed 
it would be preferable for the upper classes to be left with 
the nihilist consequences of their positivism, while the 
proletariat class developed their faith in a revolutionary 
myth. mariátegui agreed that the power of revolutionaries 
did not come from their ability to manipulate science. the 
power of revolutionaries came from their faith, passion, and 
determination. For mariátegui, revolutionary leaders were an 
embodiment of religious, mystical, and spiritual forces.
Like Gramsci, mariátegui believed the working class should 
be agents of change, not merely peaceful spectators; and 
like Sorel, mariátegui broke with the determinism of historical 
materialism to restore the power of myth to the socialist 
cause. In his 1925 essay “el Hombre y el mito,” mariátegui 
suggests that philosophers ought to stop rationalizing with 
common people because they are “simple people who are 
not able to understand subtleties.”29 mariátegui believed 
human beings are fundamentally metaphysical creatures 
who need myths or stories to give meaning to their lives, 
and neither philosophy nor the materialism of science fulfills 
a person’s profound sense of being. Scientific skepticism, 
though rational, is not fulfilling, and philosophy only provides 
relative truths. reason tells us that it is useless to believe 
in absolute truths, while science tells us that the truths we 
believe in today will be rejected tomorrow.
mariátegui did not believe the average person would or 
could understand the relativist language of philosophers and 
scientists. He argued it would be best to encourage belief 
in a revolutionary myth because, according to mariátegui, 
people only act decisively when they believe in a cause 
in an absolute way. the bourgeoisie with their science 
and philosophy had been left without absolute truths, and 
mariátegui believed it would be easy to displace them 
from power if Indigenous people and the proletariat fought 
together with a common conviction.
Ultimately, mariátegui argued for a broader definition of 
religion because, for him, communism is essentially religious.
today we know . . . that a revolution is always 
religious. the word “religion” has a new value, 
a new meaning. It connotes more than rituals or 
churches. Never mind that the Soviets write in their 
propaganda “religion is the opium of the people.” 
Communism is essentially religious.30
mariátegui recognized the similarities between religious and 
communist doctrines. Both provide absolute answers and the 
promise of a better life to come. Hence, mariátegui argued, 
the absolute answers provided by belief in a communist 
revolutionary myth are more conducive to the change he 
wished to see than a relativist dialogue.
ConClUSion
It is necessary to emphasize that mariátegui had the 
best interests of the Indigenous people in mind. He was 
passionate about this issue and worked relentlessly to secure 
the rights of Indigenous people; and when one considers 
mariátegui’s life as a whole, it is easy to be inspired by his 
work ethic despite the numerous health problems from 
which he suffered.31 Nevertheless, mariátegui is ultimately 
inconsistent in the way he relates to Indigenous people. on 
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one hand, he believes Indigenous people are human beings, 
deserving of recognition as rational autonomous agents. on 
the other hand, mariátegui also believes that Indigenous 
people are not sophisticated enough to understand scientific 
and philosophical subtleties. mariátegui was ultimately not 
confident in the ability of Indigenous people to establish 
institutions that would promote the development of their 
society.
In effect, mariátegui’s well-meaning conclusion suffers from 
the internalized paternalism of a colonized consciousness. 
mariátegui believed that since Indigenous people were not 
able to think rationally through their oppression, it would be 
best if those who could think rationally made decisions on 
behalf of those who did not so long as these were in the 
best interests of the latter. And the most urgent decision to 
be made was to change the direction and thus the command 
of the state’s institutions through a revolution. After gaining 
political power through the revolutionary process, mariátegui 
believed the Indigenous people would then be recognized 
as equal and autonomous members of the Peruvian society.
of course, there are problems with mariátegui’s approach. 
one such problem is that suggesting that people adopt 
ideologies—for instance, faith in a revolutionary myth—has 
led more than one Latin American country into the hands of 
populist demagogues.32 Another problem is that the social 
change that takes place is not authentic and consequently 
not long-lasting. this is because the individual person is not 
autonomously engaged in the process of change. the “social 
change” is only a change of who is in power and the system 
remains paternalistic, authoritarian, and unstable because 
the minds and hearts of people continue to be subject to 
manipulation.
Given our place in history, it would be easy to judge 
mariátegui’s approach as ultimately misguided. But we 
must acknowledge his historical context and understand 
that unlike our own situation in this time and age, he had no 
knowledge of the differing models of democracy currently 
prevalent and thus could not mine these models for ideas 
and guidelines as to how a society may bring about the 
changes he wished to see. When mariátegui wrote his Siete 
Ensayos, slavery had been abolished, but Perú was still a 
feudal state. the predominant consciousness of the time, 
which affected mariátegui himself, was to think of Indigenous 
people as morally immature, and generally underdeveloped 
people. mariátegui was genuinely not aware that freedom 
is not something that can be imposed upon others, or even 
gifted, but rather something that must be cultivated in an 
authentic manner by each one of us.
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